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Summary
The range of options for provincial regulation of private funding and private insurance for health services  
under the Canada Health Act (CHA) is much wider than conventionally thought.  While provinces tend to be 
considerably more restrictive than required by the CHA, existing legislation across the Canadian provinces 
presents a wide and varied menu for reform in the funding of health services.  Given this, other factors  
including provincial public opinion appear to more significantly constrain reform than the CHA.  The paper  
considers these issues with a focus on Alberta -- a province often seen to stand at the forefront of health 
care reform in Canada.
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1ExECUTIvE SUmmARy
Four Key Points
•	The	range	of	options	for	health	funding	reform	in	Alberta	that	are	consistent	with	the	CHA	is	much	wider	than	is	
often	thought	to	be	the	case.
•	Alberta’s	regulation	of	private	funding	and	insurance	of	health	services	is	more	restrictive	than	required	by	the	
CHA	and	is	more	restrictive	than	legislation	in	a	number	of	other	provinces.
•	Reforms	that	have	been	proposed	by	the	Government	of	Alberta	in	the	past	have	included	significant	reforms	
which	were	fully	consistent	with	the	CHA.		
•	Albertans	are	less	receptive	to	private	funding	and	insurance	for	health	services	than	Canadians	on	average.
Specifics
•	The	CHA	allows	a	wide	range	of	latitude	in	regulating	the	private	purchase	and	insurance	of	health	services.		The	
CHA	stipulates	the	principles	which	provinces	must	follow	in	providing	financial	reimbursement	under	their	
public	health	plans	(in	order	to	be	eligible	for	full	federal	transfers)	but	does	not	relate	to	the	delivery	of	services	
or	preclude	private	payment	or	insurance	of	health	services.
•	The	CHA	does	not	require	that	provinces	ban	the	private	purchase	of	any	type	of	health	service	but	only	limits	
the	conditions	under	which	privately-purchased	services	may	be	subsidized	through	the	public	provincial	plan.		
The	CHA	does	not	require	that	medical	practitioners	operate	fully	inside	of	(or	outside	of)	the	public	system	but,	
rather,	places	specific	limits	on	billing	procedures	for	insured	services.		The	CHA	does	not	require	that	provinces	
prohibit	private	insurance	including	insurance	for	otherwise	publicly-insured	services.		Virtually	all	federal	transfer	
reductions	under	the	CHA	have	been	related	to	user	fees.			The	issue	of	extra-billing	(physician	fees	charged	in	
addition	to	the	fee	paid	under	the	public	plan)	is	less	clear.
•	Enforcement	of	the	CHA	by	the	federal	government	is	largely	discretionary.		Interpretation	and	enforcement	of	the	
CHA	remains	primarily	a	prerogative	of	the	federal	minister	with	important	areas	remaining	open	to	the	minister’s	
discretion.		The	CHA	legislation	is	not	justiciable	–	it	is	neither	agreed	to	by	both	parties,	legally	binding	on	either	
party,	nor	does	it	create	a	set	of	citizen	entitlements	which	may	be	claimed	through	the	courts.		Discerning	the	
limits	of	CHA	requirements	requires	an	understanding	of	previous	federal	interpretations	of	the	CHA	as	well	as	
practices	allowed	in	other	provinces.		
•	Current	regulation	in	Alberta	goes	significantly	beyond	CHA	requirements.		Alberta’s	prohibition	of	the	provision	
of	certain	medical	services	outside	the	public	health	system,	requirement	that	physicians	operate	either	complete-
ly	inside	the	public	system	or	opt-out	of	public	payment	completely,	and	blanket	ban	on	the	provision	of	private	
insurance	for	otherwise	publicly-insured	health	services	are	all	not	required	by	the	CHA.		Other	provinces	allow	
some	or	all	of	these	practices.
•	A	range	of	CHA-compliant	options	can	be	drawn	from	cross-provincial	comparisons.		Existing	provincial	legisla-
tion	elsewhere	allows	for	private	funding,	private	provision	of	services,	and	private	insurance	including	the	follow-
ing:
o	 no	restrictions	on	the	private	purchase	of	health	services	where	fully	privately	funded;	
o	 no	restrictions	on	the	provision	of	private	insurance	for	health	services	(restrictions	only	on	public	reim-
bursement	for	health	services);	
o	 no	restrictions	allowing	non-participating	physicians	to	bill	privately	at	unrestricted	rates	with	patients	be-
ing	reimbursed	(up	to	the	public	rate	schedule)	while	allowing	patients	to	insure	for	the	difference;
2o	 no	restrictions	allowing	participating	physicians	to	bill	the	public	plan	directly	for	particular	instances	of	
provision	of	a	service	and	bill	patients	directly	for	other	instances	of	service	provision	(at	unrestricted	rates		
and	without	public	compensation)	with	the	patient	being	able	to	insure	for	the	latter.
•	Other		practices	which	may	be	considered	CHA-compliant	based	on	federal	interpretations	to	date	include:	
o	 the	charging	of	facility	fees	by	either	private	or	public	facilities	for		services	provided	by	a	physician	(either	
opted-in	or	opted-out)	where	the	physician	fee	is	not	remunerated	by	the	public	plan;
o	 the	charging	of	annual	registration	fees	by	private	facilities	which	offer	a	mix	of	uninsured	and	insured	
services	(contravening	the	CHA	only	if	non-payment	of	the	annual	registration	fee	reduces	patient	access	to	
insured	services.)		
•	The	CHA	did	not	appear	to	constitute	the	main	factor	constraining	the	Government	of	Alberta	from	proceeding	
with	the	recommendations	of	either	the	Premier’s	Advisory	Council	on	Health	(The	Mazankowski	Report)	or	the	
Alberta’s	Health	Policy	Framework,	2006.		Public	opinion	appears	to	have	been	a	more	significant	constraint.		
•	Public	support	in	Alberta	is	relatively	divided	between	support	for	strong	enforcement	of	the	CHA	versus	greater	
provincial	latitude.		However,	based	on	a	number	of	surveys	conducted	between	2005	and	2007,	public	opinion	
in	Alberta	was	less	supportive	of	private	health	funding	and	insurance	than	is	the	case	in	other	provinces	and	
relative	to	Canadian	public	opinion	more	generally.		Albertan	respondents	are	the	least	likely	in	any	province	to	
feel	that	private	insurance	will	have	a	positive	impact	on	them	personally.		Alberta	is	the	only	province	in	which	
public	perceptions	were	that	greater	private	involvement	would	lower	the	quality	of	health	services.
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In	recent	debates	over	health	care	financing	reform	in	Alberta,	the	options	for	reform	have	typically	been	portrayed	
as	a	dichotomy	between	marginal	adjustments	to	the	status	quo	versus	broad-reaching	change	which	would	
necessarily	entail	violation	of	the	Canada Health Act (CHA).		The	paper	examines	the	scope	for	the	redefinition	of	the	
public/private	divide	in	health	funding	under	the	rubric	of	the	CHA.		In	so	doing,	the	paper	provides	an	overview	
of	the	existing	regulatory	status	quo	including	the	requirements	of	the	CHA	and	the	enforcement	of	the	CHA	to	
date.		Secondly,	it	examines	the	regulation	of	private	funding	and	insurance	in	Alberta	from	a	cross-provincial	
comparative	perspective	in	light	of	existing	regulation	in	other	provinces.		Thirdly,	the	paper	considers	reforms	that	
have	been	proposed	in	Alberta	(including	the	Mazankowski	Report	and	Health Policy Framework, 2006)	in	light	of	
CHA	requirements,	practices	in	other	provinces,	as	well	as	recent	reform	proposals	in	other	provinces.		Finally,	the	
paper	provides	a	review	of	existing	public	opinion	polling	relating	to	public	support	for	private	payment	for	quicker/
enhanced	services,	private	insurance	as	well	as	various	health	insurance	scenarios	and	considers	the	political	
implications	for	health	finance	reform.
	
Using	a	cross-provincial	comparative	perspective,	the	paper	argues	that	no	province	allows	private	funding	and	
insurance	for	health	services	to	the	full	extent	available	under	the	CHA	and,	secondly,	that	Alberta	is	currently	more	
restrictive	in	its	regulation	of	private	funding	and	insurance	of	health	services	than	a	number	of	provinces.		
	
Despite	the	conventional	portrayal	of	a	dichotomy	between	marginal	adjustments	to	the	current	system	of	
funding	health	services	under	the	CHA	and	more	far-reaching	changes	that	violate	the	CHA,	the	empirical	findings	
presented	here	imply	that	the	range	of	options	for	health	funding	reform	in	Alberta	under	the	CHA	is	much	wider	
than	conventionally	thought	to	be	the	case.		While	the	paper	does	not	assess	the	likely	effects	or	desirability	of	
various	reforms,	it	argues	that	significant	reform	is	possible	under	the	CHA	and	that	the	main	constraints	on	
such	reform	are	more	likely	to	lie	in	patterns	of	provincial	public	support	for	various	reform	options	than	in	the	
constraints	posed	by	the	CHA.
REGULATION OF PRIvATE FUNDING AND INSURANCE FOR HEALTH SERvICES UNDER THE CHA
As	the	legislation	itself	states,	the	primary	policy	objective	of	the	CHA	is	to	“facilitate	reasonable	access	to	health	
services	without	financial	or	other	barriers.”	1		In	so	doing,	the	CHA	requires	that,	in	order	to	qualify	for	full	federal	
funding,	provincial	public	health	insurance	coverage	be	universally	available	on	uniform	terms	and	conditions	
without	any	barriers	to	reasonable	access	including	barriers	of	a	financial	nature.2		In	pursuit	of	these	outcomes,	
the	CHA	places	three	types	of	restrictions	on	transfers	to	provinces	–	conditions,	criteria	(with	provisions	for	
discretionary	penalties),	and	non-discretionary	penalties	for	two	defined	practices	(extra-billing	and	user	fees).3
			
The	two	“conditions”	of	the	CHA	are	that	provincial	governments	provide	the	federal	Minister	with	information	
required	for	the	purposes	of	administering	the	Act	and	that	provincial	governments	give	recognition	to	federal	
transfers	in	advertising	and	promotional	material	related	to	insured	health	services.4		In	addition	to	these	non-
substantive	conditions,	the	overarching	policy	goal	of	reasonable	access	to	health	services	without	financial	or	
other	barriers	is	embodied	in	the	five	criteria	of	the	CHA:	universality	(public	insurance	coverage	must	be	available	
on	uniform	terms	and	conditions	to	all	provincial	residents),	comprehensiveness	(public	insurance	must	cover	all	
medically-necessary	physician	and	hospital	services),	accessibility	(reasonable	access	to	insured	services	is	not	to	be	
impaired	by	charges	or	other	mechanisms	and	reasonable	compensation	must	be	made	to	physicians	for	providing	
insured	services),	portability	(residents	must	be	covered	when	they	are	temporarily	out	of	the	province)	and	public	
1	Canada Health Act, 1984,	s.	3.		Accessed	online	(13/05/08)	at	http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-6/17077.html.
2	Canada Health Act, 1984,	s.	6.		
3	User-fees	are	defined	as	charges	by	a	facility	in	cases	where	physician	fees	are	covered	by	the	provincial	health	insurance	plan	and	extra-
billing	occurs	where	a	physician	directly	bills	the	provincial	health	plan	for	a	service	and	simultaneously	bills	the	patient	an	additional	
amount	for	the	service.				
4	Canada Health Act, 1984,	s.	13.		
1administration	(a	public	agency	must	administer	the	public	plan).		The	enforcement	mechanism	for	these	five	
principles	is	the	federal	ability	to	withhold	federal	fiscal	transfers	on	a	discretionary	basis.5		No	province	has	yet	
been	penalized	for	a	violation	of	any	of	the	five	criteria	of	the	CHA.6		
In	addition	to	the	discretionary	enforcement	of	the	five	criteria	of	the	Act,	the	CHA	also	sets	provisions	for	
mandatory	deductions	for	non-compliance	with	its	provisions	regarding	user-fees	and	extra-billing	which	are	
spelled	out	in	separate	sections	of	the	Act.		Thus,	the	CHA	provides	for	dollar-for-dollar	penalties	for	extra-billing	
allowed	within	a	province:	“…no	payments	may	be	permitted…under	the	health	care	insurance	plan	of	the	
province	in	respect	of	insured	health	services	that	have	been	subject	to	extra-billing	by	medical	practitioners	or	
dentists.”7		A	similar	provision	exists	for	user-fees.		Supplementing	the	CHA	legislation,	the	‘Marleau	letter’	of	1995	
outlines	the	federal	interpretation	of	the	CHA	that	fees	charged	by	private	medical	facilities	constitute	a	user	fee	if	
physician-services	portion	of	the	costs	is	covered	directly	by	the	provincial	health	insurance	plan.8
	
There	are	two	means	by	which	such	mandatory	penalties	may	be	assessed	under	these	sections	of	the	Act.		The	first	
is	triggered	when	provinces	self-report	extra-billing	and	user-fees	under	provisions	spelled	out	in	the	Extra-billing 
and User Charges Information Regulations put	in	force	under	the	Act.9		Given	the	provisions	of	the	CHA,	the	federal	
minister	has	no	discretion	in	imposing	transfer	reductions	on	provinces	that	self-report	extra-billing	and	user-fees.		
In	the	second	instance,	where	extra-billing	and	charging	of	user-fees	takes	place	but	is	not	reported	as	such	by	
the	province,	the	federal	Minister	shall	(“where	information	is	not	provided	in	accordance	with	the	regulations”)	
levy	penalties	“in	an	amount	that	the	Minister	estimates	to	have	been	so	charged.”10		In	such	cases,	it	remains	the	
prerogative	of	the	federal	minister	to	determine	whether	extra-billing	and	the	charging	of	user-fees	is	taking	place	
although	deductions,	in	an	amount	determined	by	the	minister,	are	mandatory	if	this	is	found	to	be	the	case.		To	
date,	no	penalties	have	been	levied	based	on	a	ministerial	determination	that	extra-billing	and	the	charging	of	user-
fees	has	occurred	and	transfer	reductions	have	only	taken	place	when	extra-billing	and	user-fees	have	been	self-
reported	by	a	province.11		
	
Taking	these	various	provisions	together,	the	CHA	at	the	broadest	level	stipulates	the	principles	which	provinces	
must	follow	in	providing	financial reimbursement	under	their	public	health	plans	in	order	to	be	eligible	for	full	
federal	transfers.		That	is,	the	legislation	relates	primarily	to	the	financing	of	health	services	and	not	directly	to	how	
they	are	actually	provided	or	by	whom.		The	CHA	does	not	speak,	whatsoever,	to	the	delivery	of	services	and	thus	
draws	no	distinction	between	funding	and	delivery.		Put	most	simply,	if	funding	arrangements	are	CHA-compliant,	
the	delivery	is	necessarily	CHA-compliant.		Thus,	funding	and	delivery	should	not	be	considered	separately	in	
terms	of	CHA-compliance	and	funding	must	receive	central	focus.
	
Moreover,	in	terms	of	funding,	it	is	important	to	realize	the	limited	scope	of	CHA	proscriptions.		First,	the	CHA	
does	not	require	that	provinces	ban	the	private	purchase	of	any	type	of	health	service.		What	it	does	limit	are	
the	conditions	under	which	privately-purchased	services	may	be	subsidized	through	the	public	provincial	plan.			
Secondly,	the	CHA	does	not	require	that	medical	practitioners	operate	fully	inside	of	(or	outside	of)	the	public	
system	but,	rather,	places	specific	limits	on	billing	procedures	for	insured	services.		Of	course,	all	physicians	
5	Canada Health Act, 1984,	s.	15.		
6	Health	Canada,	Canada Health Act Annual Report 2006-2007,	6.
7	Canada Health Act, 1984,	s.	18.			
8	Minister	of	Health	and	Welfare,	Federal Policy on Private Clinics,	6	January	1995.		Accessed	on	15/05/08	at	http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/
hcs-sss/medi-assur/interpretation/index_e.html.		
9	Extra-billing and User Charges Information Regulations	Accessed	on	14/05/08	at	http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cr/SOR-
86-259///en.
10	Canada Health Act, 1984,	s.	18.			
11	The	only	exception	was	the	case	of	BC	in	which	the	province	reported	extra-billing	in	a	given	fiscal	year	and	then	failed	to	report	it	in	
subsequent	years.		In	this	case,	estimates	of	extra-billing	were	made	for	the	non-reported	years	on	the	basis	of	information	provided	by	
the	province	in	the	year	in	which	it	reported	extra-billing.		Information	from	telephone	interview	with	official	in	Health	Canada,	Canada 
Health Act	Enforcement	Branch.
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5combine	income	streams	from	public	and	private	incomes	sources	–	the	latter	primarily	for	services	that	are	not	
insured	under	the	public	plan.		However,	even	for	medically-necessary	services,	the	CHA	makes	reference	only	
to	the	status	of	services	(i.e.	either	insured	on	non-insured)	and	makes	no	reference	whatsoever	to	the	status	of	
practitioners.12		Thirdly,	as	it	only	governs	public	reimbursement	for	health	services,	the	CHA	does	not	require	that	
provinces	prohibit	private	insurance	for	otherwise	publicly-insured	services.		However,	as	it	requires	federal	transfer	
reductions	for	extra-billing	and	charging	of	user-fees	for	insured	services,	the	CHA	implicitly	places	limits	on	the	
room	for	third-party	insurance	to	supplement	public	insurance	for	services	that	are	publicly-covered	and	directly	
billed	to	the	plan.		
	
In	addition	to	the	limits	on	the	range	of	practices	to	which	the	CHA	applies,	it	is	also	critical	to	note	that,	given	the	
nature	of	the	legislation,	enforcement	of	the	CHA	is	primarily	a	political	rather	than	legal	issue.		First,	despite	the	
existence	of	a	dispute	resolution	mechanism,13	the	interpretation	and	enforcement	of	the	CHA	remains	primarily	
a	prerogative	of	the	federal	minister	and,	as	outlined	above,	the	legislation	confers	considerable	discretion	on	
the	minister	with	important	areas	remaining	open	to	federal	interpretation.14		Secondly,	the	legislation	is	not	
justiciable	–	it	is	neither	agreed	to	by	both	parties,	legally	binding	on	either	party,	nor	does	it	create	a	set	of	citizen	
entitlements	which	may	be	claimed	through	the	courts.15		
Given	this,	it	is	not	primarily	to	legal	interpretation	but,	rather,	previous	federal	interpretations	of	the	CHA	as	
well	as	practices	allowed	in	other	provinces	to	which	one	must	turn	in	attempting	to	discern	the	limits	of	the	
CHA	requirements.		At	the	same	time,	the	highly	discretionary	basis	of	CHA	enforcement	implies	that	the	federal	
government	is	not	bound	by	such	precedents	in	future	interpretations	of	the	CHA.		However,	it	would	undoubtedly	
be	more	difficult	politically	for	the	federal	government	to	levy	transfer	reductions	against	a	province	for	practices	
which	it	has	allowed	in	the	past	or	which	are	currently	allowed	under	provincial	legislation	in	other	provinces.			
An Overview of Penalties Imposed Under the CHA
Some	indications	of	the	boundaries	of	the	CHA	can	be	discerned	from	an	examination	of	the	enforcement	of	the	
CHA	to	date.		Upon	coming	into	force	in	1984,	the	CHA	allowed	provinces	a	three-year	grace	period	under	which	
transfer	reductions	would	be	refunded	to	the	provinces	if	the	practices	generating	reductions	were	discontinued	
by	April	1987.		Seven	provinces	(New	Brunswick,	Québec,	Ontario,	Manitoba,	Saskatchewan,	Alberta	and	British	
Columbia)	faced	transfer	reductions	during	this	three	year	period	which	were	refunded	as	all	Canadian	provinces	
were	deemed	to	be	complying	with	provisions	regarding	extra-billing	and	user-fees	by	April	1987.16		No	further	
transfer	reductions	were	levied	against	any	province	until	1994-95	when	federal	transfers	to	British	Columbia	were	
reduced	as	a	result	of	provincial	reporting	of	extra-billing	in	that	province.		Since	1994,	federal	transfer	reductions	
12	The	legislation	requires	that	“…no	payments	may	be	permitted…under	the	health	care	insurance	plan	of	the	province	in	respect	of	
insured	health	services	that	have	been	subject	to	extra-billing	by	medical	practitioners	or	dentists.”		However,	it	might	alternatively	have	
required	that	no	payments	may	be	permitted	under	the	health	care	insurance	plan	of	the	provinces	in	respect	of	health	services	that	have	
been	provided	by	medical practitioners	engaging	in	practices	where	public	health	insurance	plan	payments	have	not	been	accepted	as	
payment	for	services	in	full.
13	The	dispute	avoidance	and	resolution	process	was	agreed	to	by	the	federal	and	provincial	ministers	of	health	(except	Québec)	in	April	
2002.			The	agreement	provides	that	where	dispute	avoidance	is	unsuccessful,	either	the	federal	or	provincial	minister	“may	refer	the	issues	
to	a	third-party	panel	to	undertake	fact-finding	and	provide	advice	and	recommendations.”		However,	the	federal	Minister	of	Health	retains	
final	authority	to	enforce	the	CHA	and	is	only	required	to	“take	the	panel’s	report	into	consideration”	in	so	doing.		Canada Health Act 
Annual Report, 2006-2007,		8	and	esp.	Appendix	C.
14	As	the	CHA	is	federal	legislation	rather	than	an	intergovernmental	agreement,	even	in	those	cases	where	a	practice	is	clearly	within	or	
outside	the	parameters	established	by	the	CHA,	the	federal	government	retains	the	prerogative	to	unilaterally	amend	the	legislation.
15	As	the	Report	of	the	Task	Force	on	the	Funding	of	the	Health	Care	System	(Québec)	notes:	“From	the	legal	standpoint,	the	Canada 
Health Act does	not	confer	any	rights	on	persons	that	they	could	invoke	to	have	their	province	adopt	measures	intended	to	give	them	
access	to	health	services...”	(255)		This	conclusion	is	based	on	a	legal	study	commissioned	by	the	Task	Force.	See	Patrick	Molinari,	
“L’interpretation	de	la	Loi	canadienne	sur	la	santé:	rèperes	et	balises.”	November	2007.
16	Health	Canada,	Canada Health Act Annual Report 2006-2007,	10.
1under	the	CHA	have	become	more	commonplace	and	have	set	precedents	for	current	enforcement	of	the	CHA	--	
especially	in	regard	to	user-fees	charged	by	private	clinics.		(See	Table	1.)
Virtually	all	of	the	federal	transfer	reductions	under	the	CHA	(except	reductions	for	extra-billing	in	British	Columbia	
from	1992-1995)	since	the	initial	grace	period	have	been	related	to	non-compliance	with	the	federal	policy	on	
private	clinics	as	outlined	in	the	Marleau	letter	which	stipulates	that	fees	charged	by	a	private	facility	for	services	
for	which	the	physician	fee	is	paid	by	the	provincial	public	plan	constitute	a	user	fee	and	require	a	mandatory	
CHA	reduction	in	federal	transfers.		Fees	charged	by	facilities	(both	public	and	private)	continue	to	be	a	central	
issue	in	CHA	enforcement.		While	reporting	has	not	yet	taken	place	for	the	period	following	fiscal	year	2004-05,	
British	Columbia	in	2006	ordered	public	hospitals	to	discontinue	the	practice	of	allowing	the	charging	of	fees	
for	expedited	access	to	insured	diagnostic	services	and	Québec	“took	action	to	discourage”	private	clinics	from	
charging	user-fees	for	insured	services.17
Table 1: Federal Transfer Reductions under CHA, 1987-2008
PRovinCe PeRiod deduCTion issue
British	Columbia 1992-1995 $2.025M Extra-Billing	by	
Physicians
Alberta 1995-1996 $3.585M Non-compliance	with	
federal	policy	on	private	
clinics	(user	fees)
Newfoundland 1995-1997 $284,430 Non-compliance	with	
federal	policy	on	private	
clinics	(user	fees)
Manitoba 1995-1998 $2.355M Non-compliance	with	
federal	policy	on	private	
clinics	(user	fees)
Nova	Scotia 1995-2003 $372,135 Non-compliance	with	
federal	policy	on	private	
clinics	(user	fees)
British	Columbia 2000-2005 $347,718 Non-compliance	with	
federal	policy	on	private	
clinics	(user	fees)
Newfoundland 2002-03 $4,610 User	fee	in	public	
hospital
Nova	Scotia 2004-05 $9,460 Extra-Billing*
ToTAL 1987-2008 $8,977M
Source:	Health	Canada,	Canada Health Act Annual Report, 2006-2007.
*Reported	by	province	but	no	further	details	provided	by	Health	Canada.
	The	precedents	for	federal	transfer	reductions	under	the	CHA	make	clear	the	federal	commitment	to	the	principles	
outlined	in	the	Marleau	letter	of	1995	–	facility	fees	charged	for	services	where	the	physician	fee	is	covered	by	the	
provincial	health	insurance	plan	are	considered	user-fees	triggering	a	dollar-for-dollar	reduction	in	federal	transfers.		
However,	the	issue	of	extra-billing	(as	opposed	to	user	fees)	is	much	less	clear	in	certain	respects	as	outlined	below.		
The	single	existing	precedent	(federal	transfer	reductions	for	extra-billing	in	British	Columbia	from	1992-1995)	is	
much	less	clear	in	its	implications	than	is	the	case	for	user	fees	charged	in	private	facilities.
17	Health	Canada,	Canada Health Act Annual Report, 2006-2007,	11.
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7Transfer Reductions for Extra-Billing in British Columbia, 1992-1995 
The	case	of	transfer	reductions	for	extra-billing	in	British	Columbia	in	the	period	from	1992	to	1995	warrants	
special	attention	as	it	marked	the	first	penalties	levied	under	the	CHA	following	the	1984-87	grace	period	for	
provinces	to	come	into	CHA	compliance	and	is	the	only	significant	example	of	transfer	reductions	made	in	
respect	of	extra-billing.18		The	technical	matters	at	issue	in	this	instance	of	transfer	reductions	are	quite	complex.		
Furthermore,	the		corresponding	political	context	in	which	these	transfer	reductions	occurred	was	quite	peculiar	
making	it	difficult	to	discern	the	enforcement	precedents	set.	As	reported	in	the	Canada Health Act Annual Report, 
2006-07:		
As	a	result	of	a	dispute	between	the	British	Columbia	Medical	Association	and	the	British	Columbia	
government	over	compensation,	several	doctors	opted	out	of	the	provincial	health	insurance	plan	and	began	
billing	their	patients	directly.	Some	of	these	doctors	billed	their	patients	at	a	rate	greater	than	the	amount	
the	patients	could	recover	from	the	provincial	health	insurance	plan.		This	higher	amount	constituted	
extra-billing	under	the	Act.	Including	deduction	adjustments	for	prior	years,	dating	back	to	fiscal	year	
1992-1993,	deductions	began	in	May	1994	until	extra-billing	by	physicians	was	banned	when	changes	to	
British	Columbia’s	Medicare Protection Act came	into	effect	in	September	1995.	In	total,	$2.025	million	was	
deducted	from	British	Columbia’s	cash	contribution	for	extra-billing	that	occurred	in	the	province	between	
1992-1993	and	1995-1996.19
Technically,	the	billing	practices	in	question	constituted	extra-billing	under	the	CHA	not	because	the	federal	
minister	had	investigated	the	practices	and	made	a	determination	that	this	was	the	case	in	fact	but,	rather,	because	
the	BC	Minister	of	Health	had	investigated	the	practices,	determined	that	(in	the	provincial	Minister’s	estimation)	
extra-billing	was	occurring,	and	reported	specific	amounts	to	the	federal	Minister	as	extra-billing.		Thus,	these	
practices	constituted	extra-billing	under	the	CHA	because	they	were	reported	by	the	province	as	extra-billing	leaving	
the	federal	Minister	with	no	discretion	in	imposing	transfer	reductions	under	the	extra-billing	provision	of	the	CHA.
	
Legislation	was	brought	in	by	the	BC	government	to	ban	extra-billing	to	which	the	CHA Annual Report	attributes	
the	cessation	of	federal	transfer	reductions.20		This	legislation	stipulates	that	medical	practitioners	enrolled	in	the	
public	health	insurance	plan	(whether	billing	the	plan	directly	or	electing	to	bill	patients	who	would	then	seek	
reimbursement	from	the	plan)	could	not	charge	in	excess	of	the	provincial	rate	schedule	for	insured	services.		
Furthermore,	medical	practitioners	not	enrolled	in	the	provincial	health	insurance	plan	cannot	charge	in	excess	of	
the	provincial	rate	schedule	if	the	service	is	provided	in	a	hospital	or	continuing	care	facility.21		This	represented	
a	change	from	the	1992	legislation	which	allowed	physicians	operating	under	the	plan	to	elect	to	bill	patients	
directly	(potentially	at	rates	higher	than	the	provincial	fee	schedule)	with	the	latter	being	allowed	to	make	a	claim	
to	the	provincial	health	insurance	plan	for	amounts	up	to	the	provincial	fee	schedule	rate.22		By	virtue	of	making	
an	election	to	bill	patients	directly,	practitioners	would	be	required	to	bill	all	patients	directly	for	all	services	thus	
forfeiting	their	ability	to	bill	the	plan	directly	for	any	services	provided	to	any	patient.		
	
18	With	the	exception	of	a	nominal	transfer	reduction	of	$9,460	applied	against	Nova	Scotia	for	provincially-reported	extra-billing	charges	
in	2004-05.
19	Health	Canada,	Canada Health Act Annual Report 2006-2007,	11-12.
20	British	Columbia	Legislative	Assembly.		Bill	54	(1995)	–	An	Act	to	Protect	Medicare.		Accessed	online	15/05/2008	at	http://www.leg.
bc.ca/1995/1st_read/gov54-1.htm.
21	British	Columbia	Legislative	Assembly.		Bill	54	(1995)	–	An	Act	to	Protect	Medicare,	s.17.2(2).
22	British	Columbia	Legislative	Assembly.		Bill	71	(1992)	–	Medical	and	Health	Care	Services	Act,	esp.	s.13	(1)	and	s.13	(9)(a)(ii).		The	
1992	legislation	also	prohibited	the	provision	of	third-party	private	insurance	for	publicly-insured	services.	See	s.39(1).		The	1992	leg-
islation	represented	a	significant	change	from	the	status	quo	under	which,	by	virtue	of	the	Medical Service Plan Act, 1981,	direct	and	
extra-billing	were	completely	prohibited:	“No	medical	practitioner	participating	in	the	plan	shall...seek	compensation	by	means	of	balance	
billing,	extra	billing	or	extra	charging,	or	demand	or	receive	any	payment	other	than	a	payment	under	the	agreement	and	plan	at	the	rate	
applicable	for	that	service...”	s.3(2).		By	virtue	of	this	provision,	medical	practitioners	would	be	required	to	bill	either	completely	inside	the	
provincial	plan	or	completely	outside	of	it	and,	in	the	latter	case,	the	legislation	made	no	provision	for	financial	compensation	to	patients.
9In	terms	of	the	political	context,	the	NDP	government	in	British	Columbia	was	opposed	to	“extra-billing”	and	
believed	that	federal	transfer	reductions	levied	against	the	province	would	help	increase	political	pressure	on	
provincial	physicians	to	end	the	practice.23		As	a	result,	the	government	of	British	Columbia	had	“encouraged	the	
federal	government	to	go	ahead	with	its	punishment...”24		The	BC	Health	Minister	Paul	Ramsey	stated	publicly:	
“We	agree	with	the	[federal]	minister	that	extra-billing	is	not	an	acceptable	practice,	and	the	federal	government	is	
within	its	rights	if	they	choose	to	cut	our	transfer	payments	because	of	it.”25		In	fact,	by	reporting	specific	amounts	
as	having	been	extra-billed,	the	province	went	beyond	encouraging	the	federal	minister	to	apply	transfer	reductions	
and	actually	made	the	reductions	mandatory	under	federal	legislation.		That	is,	federal	transfer	reductions	were	
levied	because	the	provincial	Minister	made	a	determination	that	specific	practices	were	non-compliant	with	CHA	
requirements	–	the	federal	Minister	did	not	formally	make	such	a	determination.		This	makes	it	difficult	to	use	
this	instance	of	federal	transfer	reductions	as	a	precedent	for	federal	enforcement	of	CHA	restrictions	against	extra-
billing.
	
Two	clear	base	points	emerge	from	a	combined	reading	of	the	CHA	itself	and	its	enforcement	following	its	full	
adoption:	user-fees	and	extra-billing	are	non-compliant	and	require	a	mandatory	reduction	of	federal	transfers.		
Practices	outside	of	these	two	clear	instances	of	non-compliance	remain	open	to	interpretation	and	subject	to	the	
politics	of	CHA-enforcement.
Health Reform in Alberta (Bill 11) and the Politics of Federal CHA Enforcement
The	political	dynamics	shaping	the	politics	of	CHA	enforcement	are	highlighted	by	federal-provincial	conflict	in	
early	2000	over	Alberta’s	Bill	11	--	which	now	as	the	Alberta Health Care Protection Act	comprises	a	central	pillar	
of	health	funding	regulation	in	Alberta.		The	federal-provincial	politics	around	the	issue	of	Bill	11	and	CHA-
compliance	illustrate	the	limited	constraints	on	provinces	under	a	strict	reading	of	the	provisions	of	the	CHA,	the	
degree	of	latitude	for	federal	interpretation	of	the	CHA,	and	the	complexity	of	the	politics	of	CHA	enforcement.		
Compliance	with	the	CHA	was	a	central	issue	in	the	politics	of	the	reform	legislation.		The	central	political	strategy	
of	opponents	of	the	legislation	when	the	Alberta	government	introduced	Bill	11	in	the	legislature	in	early	March	
2000	was	to	argue	that	it	contravened	the	CHA.		Perhaps	most	notably,	there	was	extensive	media	coverage	of	legal	
analysis	(commissioned	by	CUPE)	which	alleged	that	the	legislation	violated	CHA	criteria	of	comprehensiveness,	
universality,	accessibility,	and,	possibly,	public-administration.26		Moreover,	prominent	critics	of	the	legislation	such	
as	Saskatchewan	Premier	Roy	Romanow	also	argued	that	the	legislation	violated	the	CHA	(and	continued	to	argue	
that	this	was	the	case	even	after	the	federal	government	conceded	that	the	legislation	did	not	do	so.)		Proponents,	
most	notably	Premier	Klein,	maintained	consistently	that	the	Alberta	government	did	not	believe	that	the	legislation	
represented	a	violation	of	the	CHA.27		Apparently	anticipating	that	the	federal	government	would	not	conclude	that	
the	legislation	was	in	violation	of	the	CHA, the	Alberta	government,	on	introducing	the	bill	to	the	Alberta	legislative	
assembly,	forwarded	a	copy	to	the	federal	Health	Minister	Allan	Rock	and	formally	requested	confirmation	in	regard	
to	whether	the	legislation	represented	a	violation	of	the	CHA.28		
23	Ross	Howard,	“Marleau	to	Punish	BC	for	Fees,”	Globe and Mail,	19	May	1994,	A1.
24	Ibid.
25	Rod	Mickleburgh,	“Ottawa	Gets	Tough	Over	BC	Extra-Billing,”	Globe and Mail,	23	April	1994,	A1.
26	Heather	Scoffield,	“Legal	Opinions	Rip	Klein’s	Health	Bill:	Alberta’s	Plan	Would	Violate	Canada	Health	Act,”	Globe and Mail,	14	
March	2000,	A1.
27	Tim	Harper,	“Rock	Takes	Medicare	Fight	to	Alberta,”	Toronto Star,	10	March	2000,	NE06.
28	Jill	Mahoney,	“Ottawa	Taking	Its	Time	on	Health-Care	Bill,	Klein	Says,”	Globe and Mail,	21	March	2000,	A5;  Dean	Bennett,	“Health	
Care	Debate	Becoming	Ugly,”	Toronto Star,	14	March	2000,	NE07;	Tim	Harper,	“Rock	Says	He	Will	Go	Directly	to	Albertans,”	Toronto 
Star,	17	March	2000,	NE07.
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The	federal	government	was	extremely	careful	to	avoid	confirming	publicly	whether	the	legislation	was	considered	
to	be	in	violation	with	the	CHA	or	CHA-compliant.		In	the	face	of	questions	regarding	CHA-compliance,	the	
federal	Minister’s	first	response	was	that	the	federal	government	was	in	the	process	of	reviewing	the	legislation	as	
introduced	in	the	Alberta	legislature	but	that	federal	legal	opinions	were	not	yet	available.29		The	federal	Health	
Minister	would	later	argue	that	the	federal	government	would	not	consider	the	draft	legislation	as	it	would	be	
subject	to	amendments	but	would	wait	for	final	legislation	before	making	a	determination	on	CHA-compliance.30		
Prime	Minister	Chrétien	then	announced	that	the	federal	government	would	only	make	a	determination	after	both	
the	final	legislation	and	associate		regulations	were	announced.31		Finally,	the	federal	government	announced	it	
would	only	monitor	the	operation	of	the	legislation	and	associated	regulations	in	practice	to	determine	if	violations	
of	the	CHA	were	occurring.32		
Despite	its	unwillingness	to	make	a	determination	in	regard	to	CHA-compliance,	the	federal	government	did	clearly	
state	its	opposition	to	the	bill.33		While	broadly	opposed	to	the	philosophical	underpinnings	of	the	legislation,	
the	federal	Health	Minister	outlined	two	major	concerns	in	regard	to	the	specific	proposals	made	by	Alberta:	first,	
concerns	in	respect	of	add-on	fees	for	enhanced	care	and,	second,	concerns	in	respect	of	private	clinics	being	
allowed	to	keep	patients	overnight.34		As	the	federal	Health	Minister	would	argue,	“To	permit	for-profit	facilities	to	
sell	enhanced	services	in	combination	with	insured	services	would	create	a	circumstance	that	represents	a	serious	
concern	in	relation	to	the	principle	of	accessibility.”35		The	main	federal	concern	in	this	regard	was	that	allowing	fees	
for	enhanced	services	when	provided	in	combination	with	insured	services	may	lead	to	quicker	access	to	publicly-
funded	services	for	those	patients	able	and	willing	to	pay	the	associated	private	fees.36		It	was	this	aspect	of	Bill	11	
which	the	federal	minister	warned	might,	but	did	not	conclusively,	constitute	a	violation	of	the	CHA.	
The	federal	government	also	evinced	concern	in	regard	to	overnight	stays.		Under	this	proposal,	surgical	facilities	
would	be	able	to	bill	the	public	insurance	system	for	the	surgery	but	potentially	charge	patients	more	for	“hotel”	
arrangements	for	post-operative	care.37		Such	practices	were	already	allowed	by	for-profit	clinics	for	day	surgery	as	
well	as	public	facilities	for	accommodation	beyond	semi-private	accommodation	(as	the	CHA	requires	coverage	of	
accommodation	and	meals	only	at	the	standard	ward	level.)		The	federal	minister	did	not	argue	that	this	provision	
would	violate	the	CHA	but,	rather,	that	“[t]he	Alberta	government	has	now	proposed	a	role	for	private,	for-profit	
facilities	that	goes	beyond	what	is	already	in	place	in	other	provinces	in	Canada.”38		The	federal	minister’s	argument	
in	this	regard	illustrates	a	central	point	in	the	politics	of	federal	CHA	enforcement:	the	importance	placed	by	the	
federal	government	on	practices	existing	in	other	provinces	in	making	determinations	in	regard	to	the	acceptability	
of	provincial	reforms.
29	Scoffield,	“Legal	Opinions	Rip	Klein’s	Health	Bill.”
30	Harper,	“Rock	Says	He	Will	Go	Directly	To	Albertans”;	Mahoney,	“Ottawa	Taking	Its	Time.”
31	Tim	Harper,	“Alberta	Premier	Will	Be	Threatened	with	Sanctions	over	Health	Bill,”	Toronto Star,	22	March	2000,	NE01.
32	Health	Scoffield,	“Ottawa	Can’t	Stop	Alberta’s	Health	Bill,”	Globe and Mail,	12	May	2000,	A1;	“Rock	Vows	to	Stand	Guard	on	Al-
berta’s	Health	Changes,”	Winnipeg Free Press,	12	May	2000,	B6.
33	Mahoney,	“Ottawa	Taking	Its	Time.”
34	Canada	Wire,	“Alberta	Overstepping	Bounds:	Rock,”	Winnipeg Free Press,	9	April	2000,	A6.
35	Ibid.
36	Ibid.
37	This	practice	was	already	allowed	in	Alberta	for	day	surgery.
38	Ibid.
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All	three	major	players	–	the	Alberta	Premier,	the	federal	Health	Minister,	and	the	Prime	Minister	–	recognized	
the	importance	of	legislation	in	other	provinces.		Premier	Klein	consistently	claimed	that	the	bill	included	only	
provisions	that	were	in	place	in	other	provinces	and,	as	such,	respected	the	CHA.39		In	apparent	response,	Prime	
Minister	Chrétien	stated	that	he	would	request	provincial	health	ministers		review	the	bill	to	compare	it	with	health	
programs	in	other	provinces	–	a	proposal	to	which	Premier	Klein	agreed.40		This	proposal	by	the	Prime	Minister	
illustrates	two	central	aspects	of	CHA	enforcement.		First,	it	highlights	the	degree	of	latitude	in	interpreting	the	
CHA.		While	the	CHA	clearly	outlines	particular	practices	that	require	federal	transfer	reductions,	there	is	also	
a	wide	range	of	practices	on	which	the	legislation	is	not	clear	and	requires	significant	interpretation.		Secondly,	
in	turning	to	provincial	health	ministers	in	making	this	determination,	the	Prime	Minister	implicitly	recognized	
the	realpolitik	of	CHA	enforcement	–	it	is	politically	much	more	difficult	for	the	federal	government	to	challenge	
practices	currently	allowed	under	provincial	legislation	in	other	provinces	than	would	otherwise	be	the	case.		The	
federal	government,	however,	eventually	abandoned	this	tack.
Despite	the	fact	that	the	Alberta	government	did	not	make	any	of	the	amendments	publicly	requested	by	the	
federal	health	minister,	the	federal	government	would	ultimately	concede	that	the	legislation	did	not	violate	the	
CHA.		Federal	officials	“…concede	privately	that	the	bill	as	written	is	in	keeping	with	the	principles	of	public	health	
care…”	and	do	not	believe	that	it	violates	the	CHA.41		Premier	Klein,	when	finally	informed	indirectly	on	the	day	
of	the	final	legislative	reading	of	the	bill	that	“federal	government	sources”	reported	that	Bill	11	did	not	violate	
the	CHA,	responded,	“It’s	nice	to	know,	but	it	doesn’t	come	as	much	of	a	surprise.”42		It	was	not	surprising	to	the	
degree	that	nothing	in	legislation	constituted	a	clear	violation	of	the	CHA.		As	the	issue	of	CHA-compliance	was	
then	pushed	into	the	greyer	area	of	federal	interpretation	of	the	discretionary	criteria	of	the	CHA	regarding	practices	
already	allowed	by	legislation	in	other	provinces,	the	likelihood	of	federal	penalties	diminished.					
The	enforcement	of	the	CHA	was	highly	politically	charged	with	claims	and	counter-claims	of	CHA-compliance	
being	a	central	political	weapon	in	the	arsenals	of	both	proponents	and	opponents	of	the	legislation	with	the	
federal	government	included	in	the	latter	camp:	“….the	federal	government	has	been	careful	not	to	come	out	and	
state	directly	that	the	bill	does	not	violate	the	Canada	Health	Act.		Ottawa	did	not	want	to	lend	support	to	[the]	
campaign	to	win	public	support.”43		Clearly,	there	were	no	provisions	in	the	Alberta	legislation	that	constituted	
a	clear	violation	of	the	CHA	–	making	the	politics	of	opposition	to	the	legislation	much	more	complex	than	
would	have	otherwise	been	the	case	given	that	the	primary	political	strategy	of	opponents	was	to	claim	that	the	
legislation	was	not	CHA-compliant.		At	the	same	time,	the	legislation	included	provisions	that	the	federal	minister,	
under	his	discretion	to	interpret	the	federal	legislation,	could	have	claimed	constituted	a	violation	of	the	CHA	–	
demonstrating	that	it	is	not	only	a	strict	legalistic	interpretation	of	the	CHA	that	determines	the	politics	of	CHA 
enforcement.		In	the	face	of	a	lack	of	political	will	to	make	such	an	interpretation	(shaped	in	part	by	the	existence	
of	legislation	allowing	similar	practices	in	other	provinces),	a	strict	legalistic	interpretation	of	the	CHA	allowed	
significant	latitude	for	the	Alberta	government	to	implement	reforms.		The	revisions	which	the	Alberta	government	
did	make	to	the	reform	package	were	in	response	to	political	dynamics	within	the	province	rather	than	pressures	
generated	by	federal	government	or	constraints	posed	by	the	CHA.44		
39	Adrian	Wyld,	“Other	Provinces	Have	Similar	Laws:	Klein,”	Toronto Star,	24	March	2000,	NE01.		Premier	Klein	publicly	made	specific	
reference	to	legislation	in	BC,	Saskatchewan,	Manitoba	and	Ontario	and	argued	publicly	that	all	four	had	legislative	provision	similar	to	the	
proposed	legislation	in	Alberta.
40	Ibid.;	“Ottawa	Finally	in	Position	to	Fight	Klein	on	Health,”	Toronto Star,	14	April	2000,	NE06.
41	“Key	to	Alberta	Bill	is	How	It’s	Used,”	Globe and Mail,	10	May	2000,	A2.
42	James	Cudmore,	“Klein’s	Bill	11	Set	to	Pass	Final	Hurdle,”	National Post,	10	May	2000,	A8.
43	“Key	to	Alberta	Bill	is	How	It’s	Used,”	Globe and Mail,	10	May	2000,	A2.
44	Canada	Wire,	“Extended	Overnight	Stays	at	Private	Clinics	OK,	says	Klein,”	Winnipeg Free Press,	8	April	2000,	A2.
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Current Regulation in Alberta and CHA Compliance
Alberta	goes	well	beyond	the	requirements	of	the	CHA	in	its	regulation	of	private	provision,	funding	and	insurance	
for	health	services	under	both	the	Health Care Protection Act (HCPA)	and	the	Alberta Health Care Insurance Act	
(AHCIA).45		First,	Alberta	goes	beyond	the	requirements	of	the	CHA	in	its	prohibition	of	the	provision	of	certain	
medical	services	outside	the	public	health	system	as	the	CHA	does	not	require	that	provinces	ban	the	private	
purchase	of	any	type	of	health	service.		Alberta	prohibits	private	facilities	providing	emergency	care	requiring	
medically-supervised	stays	of	more	than	twelve	hours46	as	well	as	restricting	physicians	from	performing	‘major’	
surgical	services	except	in	a	public	hospital.47		It	is	this	legislated	public	monopoly	that	led	Brian	Day,	the	President	
of	the	CMA	and	founder	of	Cambie	Surgical	Services	in	British	Columbia,	to	publicly	assert:	“Alberta,	of	all	the	
provinces	in	Canada,	is	the	most	hostile	towards	private	clinics.		We	couldn’t	function	in	Alberta.”48	
	
Secondly,	the	province	requires	that	physicians	operate	either	completely	inside	the	public	system	or	opt-out	of	
public	payment	completely.		Provincial	legislation	requires	that	physicians	completely	forfeit	all	claims	to	any	public	
compensation	if	they	wish	to	bill	patients	above	the	provincially-determined	fee	schedule	for	any	service.49		As	
outlined	above,	the	CHA,	in	relation	to	extra-billing,	only	refers	to	publicly-insured	services	which	receive	direct	
payment	under	the	provincial	health	plan	and	does	not	make	any	mention	whatsoever	to	medical	practitioners.50		
	
Thirdly,	Alberta	has	a	blanket	ban	on	the	provision	of	private	insurance	for	otherwise	publicly-insured	health	
services	under	the	Alberta Health Care Insurance Act	(AHCIA).51		As	outlined	above,	no	such	requirement	is	explicit	
or	implied	in	the	CHA.		Under	the	Health Insurance Premiums Act,	residents	may	opt	out	of	the	Alberta	Health	Care	
Insurance	Plan	and,	as	a	result,	not	be	liable	for	provincial	health	insurance	plan	premiums.52		However,	the	AHCIA	
prohibits	the	provision	of	third-party	insurance	to	opted-out	residents	who	must	bear	the	full	financial	risk	of	
foregoing	participation	in	the	public	health	insurance	plan.	
Alberta in Comparative Cross-Provincial Perspective
An	examination	of	the	means	by	which	provinces	place	limits	on	private	funding	of	publicly-insured	medical	
services	highlights	the	wide	range	of	options	are	available	to	provinces	under	the	CHA.	Provinces	vary	significantly	
in	the	approaches	they	take,	no	province	allows	private	funding	to	the	full	degree	allowed	under	the	CHA,	and	
regulation	in	Alberta	tends	to	be	more	stringent	than	in	a	number	of	other	provinces	and	clearly	more	stringent	
than	required	by	the	CHA.		
45	Alberta Health Care Insurance Act,	R.S.A.		2000,	c.A-20.		Accessed	online	on	16/05/2008	at	http://www.canlii.org/ab/laws/
sta/a-20/20060718/whole.html.			Health Care Protection Act,	R.S.A.	2000,	c.	H-1.		Accessed	online	on	16/05/2008	at	http://www.canlii.
org/ab/laws/sta/h-1/20060718/whole.html.
46	Health Care Protection Act,	R.S.A.	2000,	Part	1,	S.1	and	Part	5,	S.29	(m).
47	Health Care Protection Act,	R.S.A.	2000,	Part	1,		S.2(2).		The	definition	of	‘major	surgery’	is	determined	by	the	College	of	Physicians	
and	Surgeons	of	Alberta.		See	College	of	Physicians	and	Surgeons	of	Alberta,	2006.	
48	Michelle	Lang,	“The	Quickening	Pulse	of	Private	Health	Care,”	Edmonton Journal,	18	September	2005,	E6.
49	Alberta Health Care Insurance Act,	R.S.A.	2000,	Part	1,	S.9	(1)	and	Health Care Protection Act,	R.S.A.	2000,	Part	1,	4(b).		Fees	
may	be	collected	for	enhanced	medical	services;	however,	purchase	of	enhanced	services	cannot	be	required	in	order	to	access	the	insured	
services.		Health	Care	Protection	Act,	R.S.A.	2000,		Part	1,	S.	5	(1	and	2).	
50	There	were	no	opted-out	physicians	in	Alberta	as	of	March	31,	2007.		Health	Canada,	Canada Health Act Annual Report, 2006-2007,	
149.
51	Alberta	Health	Care	Insurance	Act,	R.S.A.	2000,	Part	1,	S.26(2,	4)		This	is	the	issue	that	was	raised	in	the	Chaoulli	case	in	which	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	found	that	Québec’s	ban	on	private	insurance	–	similar	to	the	ban	on	private	insurance	in	Alberta	–	constituted	
a	violation	of	the	Québec	Charter	of	Human	Rights	and	Freedoms	although	the	Court	was	split	(with	one	justice	abstaining)	as	to	whether	
the	ban	constituted	a	violation	of	the	Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms.		The	ruling	had	little	direct	applicability	to	the	CHA	itself	
as	the	latter	does	not	require	a	ban	on	private	insurance	for	publicly	insured	services.		Chaoulli	v.	Quebec	(Attorney	General),	[2005]	1	
S.C.R.	791,	2005	SCC	35.
52	Health Insurance Premiums Act,	Chapter	H-6,	S.25(1).		Accessed	online	on	16/05/2008	at	http://www.qp.gov.ab.ca/Documents/acts/
H06.CFM.			
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Opted Out Physicians53
Provinces	have	a	range	of	options	which	allow	them	to	effectively	limit	the	scope	of	private	funding	of	publicly-
insured	services	including	regulating	private	insurance,	regulating	billing	practices,	and	regulating	fees.		In	all	
provinces	except	Ontario,	physicians	have	the	right	to	opt	out	of	the	public	plan	which,	in	essence,	implies	that	
they	forfeit	their	ability	to	bill	the	public	plan	directly.54		(See	Figure	1	and	Table	2.)		Outside	of	not	allowing	
physicians	to	opt	out	as	is	now	the	practice	in	Ontario,	the	most	stringent	method	of	restricting	private-funding	of	
insured	services	provided	by	non-participating	physicians	is	to	limit	the	fees	they	may	legally	charge	to	the	levels	
stipulated	in	the	provincial	rate	schedule	thus	greatly	reducing	the	incentive	to	operate	outside	the	public	plan.		
Figure 1: Regulation of Private Funding for Publicly-insured Medical services, opted-out Physicians
Sources	for	Figures	1	and	2:	Colleen	M.	Flood	and	Tom	Archibald,	“The	Illegality	of	Private	Health	Care	in	
Canada,”	Canadian Medical Association Journal	164,	6	(20	March	2005):	825-30.		Supplemented	from	CHA	Annual	
Report,	2004-5.	
Notes:	Provinces	appear	in	shadow	where	a	more	stringent	existing	regulation	makes	subsequent	limitations	on	
private	insurance	coverage	superfluous.		SK	and	NB	–	public	coverage	denied;	PEI	and	MB	–	private	insurance	
prohibited.
53	Because	provincial	legislation	generally	treats	non-participating	physicians	differently	than	participating	physicians	combined	with	the	
wide	variation	among	provinces	in	regard	to	both,	it	is	helpful	to	differentiate	between	provincial	regulation	of	private-funding	of	insured	
services	provided	by	opted-out	and	opted-in	physicians.		The	paper	uses	opted-in/opted-out	and	participating/non-participating	inter-
changeably.				
54	Opting-out	of	the	public	plan	is	no	longer	generally	allowed	in	Ontario	effective	September	2004	as	a	result	of	the	coming	into	effect	of	
the	Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004.
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Opted Out Physicians
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 Provinces have a range of options which allow them to effectively limit the scope 
of private funding of publicly-insured services including regulating private insurance, 
regulating billing practices, and regulating fees.  In all provinces except Ontario, 
physicians have the right to opt out of the public plan which, in essence, implies that they 
forfeit their ability to bill the public plan directly.
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  (See Figure 1 and Table 2.)  Outside 
of not allowing physicians to opt out as is now the practice in Ontario, the most stringent 
method of restricting private-funding of insured services provided by non-participating 
physicians is to limit the fees they m y legally charge t  the levels stipulated in t e 
provincial rate schedule thus greatly reducing the incentive to operate outside the public 
plan.   
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53
 Because provincial legislation generally treats non-participating physicians differently than participating 
physicians combined with the wide variation among provinces in regard to both, it is helpful to differentiate 
between provincial regulation of private-funding of insured services provided by opted-out and opted-in 
physicians.  The paper uses opted-in/opted-out and participating/non-participating interchangeably.     
54
 Opting-out of the public plan is no longer generally allowed in Ontario effective September 2004 as a 
result of the coming into effect of the Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004. 
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Table 2: Provincial Regulation of Private income sources, by status of Physician, 2001
Physician status Regulation BC AB sK MB onA QB nB ns Pei nF
opted out Prohibits		Opting	Out N N N N Y N N N N N
Limits	on	Fees N N N Y n/a N N Y N N
Ban	on	Private	Insurance Y Y N Y n/a Y N N Y N
Public	Coverage	Denied Y Y Y N* n/a Y Y N* N* N
opted in Direct	Patient	Billing	Prohibited N* N Y* Y Y Y N Y N Y
Limits	on	Fees Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y
Ban	on	Private	Insurance Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y N
Public	Coverage	Denied*** Y Y
Basic	source	for	provincial	regulation	of	private	health	insurance	is	Colleen	M.	Flood	and	Tom	Archibald,	“The	
Illegality	of	Private	Health	Care	in	Canada,”	Canadian Medical Association Journal	164,	6	(20	March	2005):	825-30.		
Supplemented	from	CHA	Annual	Report,	2004-5.
APrior	to	the	June	2004	passage	of	the	Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004,	Ontario	allowed	physicians	to	
opt	out	although	it	limited	their	fees	to	level	set	under	the	public	plan	and	banned	private	insurance	coverage	for	such	
services	although	patients	could	apply	for	compensation	directly	from	the	plan.		Under	the	Commitment to the Future of 
Medicare Act, 2004,	physicians	are	no	longer	able	to	opt	out	and	bill	patients	directly.
*Source:	CHA	Annual	Report,	2006-7.
**Required	by	CHA.
In	Manitoba	and	Nova	Scotia,	provincial	regulations	limit	the	fees	of	opted-out	physicians	to	levels	specified	in	the	
provincial	fee	schedule.		Services	provided	by	opted-out	physicians	are	covered	by	public	insurance	(reimbursed	to	
the	patient)	but,	because	fees	are	also	capped,	there	is	simply	no	room	for	the	private	financing	of	publicly-insured	
services	provided	by	opted-out	physicians.
The	remaining	provinces	use	a	variety	of	means	to	limit	the	potential	for	the	private	funding	of	publicly-insured	
services.		Three	provinces	(Alberta,	British	Columbia	and	Québec)	deny	public	coverage	for	services	provided	by	
opted-out	physicians	while,	at	the	same	time,	implementing	a	legal	ban	(partial	in	the	case	of	Québec)	on	the	
provision	of	private,	third-party	insurance	for	those	services.55		Thus,	patients	are	able	to	receive	services	outside	
the	plan	at	rates	determined	solely	by	the	physician	although	the	patient	must	absorb	the	full	cost	of	those	services.	
Saskatchewan	and	New	Brunswick	also	deny	public	compensation	for	services	provided	by	opted-out	physicians	
although	they	do	not	prohibit	private	insurance	coverage	for	those	services.		
Both	PEI	and	Newfoundland	allow	for	public	compensation	of	patients	(up	to	the	provincial	fee	schedule)	
for	services	provided	by	opted-out	physicians	billed	at	unrestricted	rates.		While	PEI	allows	public	
compensation	for	services	provided	by	opted-out	physicians,	it	prohibits	private	insurance.		Thus,	the	patient	must	
bear	the	full	cost	of	charges	above	rates	specified	in	the	provincial	fee	schedule.		In	Newfoundland,	opted-out	
physicians	are	able	to	set	their	own	fees,	patients	are	compensated	by	the	province	for	costs	up	to	the	provincial	fee	
schedule,	and	private	third-party	insurers	are	allowed	to	insure	for	the	difference.56			
55	Québec	maintains	only	a	partial	ban	following	changes	to	allow	private	insurance	for	specified	services	in	order	to	comply	with	the	
Chaoulli	decision.		As	it	was	based	on	the	Québec	Charter	of	Human	Rights	and	Freedoms,	the	decision	has	no	force	or	effect	outside	of	
the	Province	of	Québec.
56	In	2005,	no	physicians	in	Newfoundland	had	opted-out	of	the	Newfoundland	medical	care	program.		http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/
medi-assur/pt-plans/nl_e.html#f1
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Opted In Physicians
The	potential	for	private	funding	of	publicly-insured	services	provided	by	physicians	participating	in	the	public	
health	insurance	plan	is	closely	related	to	their	ability	to	combine	both	private	and	public	income	streams	(discussed	
more	fully	below.)		In	order	for	physicians	participating	in	the	public	plan	to	have	access	to	both	public	and	private	
income	streams	for	services	covered	under	public	plans,	they	require	the	ability	to	bill	patients	directly.		If	opted-in	
physicians	bill	patients	(or	at	least	some	patients)	directly	for	services,	the	patient	pays	the	bill	and	then	must	receive	
compensation	from	the	public	plan,	absorb	the	cost	directly,	or	receive	compensation	from	a	third-party	indemnity	
insurance	plan.		In	any	case,	the	billing	physician	may	not	even	be	aware	of	the	party	which	ultimately	bears	the	
burden	of	the	payment.
Currently,	the	practice	of	participating	physicians	billing	patients	directly	is	allowed	only	in	Alberta,	British	
Columbia,	New	Brunswick	and	PEI.	(See	Figure	2.)		In	all	other	provinces,	physicians	who	opt	into	the	public	plan	
are	not	able	to	bill	patients	directly	and,	therefore,	have	no	means	by	which	to	collect	private	payment	for	publicly-
insured	services.		In	these	four	provinces	which	allow	direct	billing	of	patients	by	physicians	participating	in	the	
public	plan,	Alberta	and	British	Columbia	do	not	allow	billing	at	rates	which	are	higher	than	the	public	fee	schedule	
and,	in	turn,	there	is	no	incentive	for	patients	to	insure	for	those	services.
Figure 2: Regulation of Private Funding for Publicly-insured Medical services, opted-in Physicians
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The situation is somewhat different in New Brunswick and PEI where 
participating physicians can bill patients directly at rates above those stipulated by the 
provincial fee schedule; however, in both of these provinces, payment from the public 
plan is forfeited for a given service if the physician bills above the provincial fee 
schedule.  Thus, physicians are able to bill both the public plan and bill privately, 
however, in the latter case, the private payer must absorb the entire cost of the service.  In 
PEI, the province bans third-party insurance for publicly-insured services, so the patient 
must absorb the entire cost of the service directly.  In New Brunswick, there is no ban on 
The	situation	is	somewhat	different	in	New	Brunswick	and	PEI	where	participating	physicians	can	bill	patients	
directly	at	rates	above	those	stipulated	by	the	provincial	fee	schedule;	however,	in	both	of	these	provinces,	payment	
from	the	public	plan	is	forfeited	for	a	given	service	if	the	physician	bills	above	the	provincial	fee	schedule.		Thus,	
physicians	are	able	to	bill	both	the	public	plan	and	bill	privately,	however,	in	the	latter	case,	the	private	payer	must	
absorb	t e	entire	cost	of	the	service.		In	PEI,	the	province	bans	third-party	insurance	for	publicly-insured	services,	
so	the	patient	must	absorb	the	entire	cost	of	the	service	directly.		In	New	Brunswick,	there	is	no	ban	on	third-party	
insurance	so	participating	doctors	are	allowed	to	bill	patients	directly	for	fees	above	the	public	fee	schedule	which	
may	be,	in	turn,	covered	by	third-party	insurance	but	are	not	eligible	for	public	reimbursement.
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Figure 3: Regulation of Private Funding for Publicly-insured Medical services, opted-in and opted-out 
Physicians
Figure	3	combines	the	regulation	of	non-participating	and	participating	physicians	and	highlights	at	least	two	
aspects	of	provincial	regulation	of	private	funding	for	publicly-insured	services.		First,	there	is	wide	variation	among	
provinces	in	their	approach	to	such	regulation	and	little	clustering	of	provinces	on	a	given	approach	although	
provinces	differ	more	significantly	in	their	treatment	of	opted-out	physicians	than	in	their	treatment	of	opted-in	
physicians.		Secondly,	no	province	allows	for	private	funding	to	the	full	extent	allowed	under	the	CHA.
The Public-Private Divide
A	critical	issue	in	the	regulation	of	private	funding	is	the	degree	to	which	these	systems	enforce	a	sharp	distinction	
between	private	and	public	income	streams	for	service	providers	with	providers	opting-into	the	public	plans	
receiving	income	only	from	public	sources	for	insured	services	and	providers	opting-out	receiving	income	only	from	
private	sources	for	otherwise	publicly-insured	services.		Emphasizing	the	imagery	of	such	a	sharp	distinction,	Flood	
and	Choudhry	assert	that	“[i]n all provinces,	physicians	can	opt	out	of	the	public	system	and	operate	wholly	in	the	
private	sector	–	but they cannot work in both.”57		
In	contrast	to	this	claim	that	in	all	provinces	physicians	are	prohibited	from	working	in	both	the	“public”	and	
“private”	systems,	there	are	two	sets	of	circumstances	in	which	physicians	can	be	said	to	be	allowed	to	work	both	
in	the	public	and	private	systems:	first,	where	physician	services	are	billed	directly	to	patients	at	unrestricted	rates	
and	receive	public	subsidization	and,	second,	where	physicians	(whether	opted	in	or	opted	out)	are	able	to	receive	
public	payment	for	some	services	(at	rates	restricted	to	the	provincial	fee	schedule)	and	private	payment	for	other	
57		Flood	and	Choudhry,		2002:	15.		Flood	and	Archibald	note	that,	with	the	exception	of	Newfoundland,		“…physicians	must	opt	in	or	
out	of	the	public	plan	and	thus	are	effectively	prevented	from	working	in	both	the	public	and	private	sectors.”	Flood	and	Archibald,	829.
POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE FUNDING OF PUBLICLY-INSURED 
SERVICES SERVICES – Opted In & Opted Out Physicians
Low High
Low
High
Opted-In
Opted-Out
•Ontario
•Newfoundland
•Manitoba/Nova Scotia
•BC/Alberta•Quebec
•Saskatchewan •PEl •New Brunswick
•max allowed 
under CHA
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services.		The	first	set	of	circumstances	occurs	in	Newfoundland	where	non-participating	physicians	may	direct	bill	
at	rates	above	the	provincial	fee	schedule	with	patients	then	being	reimbursed	(up	to	the	provincial	fee	schedule)	by	
the	province.	
The	second	set	of	circumstances	obtains	for	opted-in	physicians	in	both	New	Brunswick	and	PEI	who	may	
bill	patients	directly	at	rates	above	the	provincial	fee	schedule	for	some	services	(though	with	no	provincial	
compensation	being	provided	for	those	services)	while	also	billing	the	provincial	plan	directly	for	other	services.		In	
New	Brunswick,	patients	are	allowed	to	carry	private	insurance	for	such	instances	while,	in	PEI,	private	insurance	
coverage	is	prohibited.		In	PEI,	opted-out	physicians	may	also	provide	services	for	which	patients	are	reimbursed	by	
the	public	plan	(if	they	are	not	billed	at	rates	above	the	provincial	fee	schedule)	while	also	billing	for	services	(if	they	
are	billed	at	rates	above	the	provincial	fee	schedule)	which	are	not	eligible	for	public	benefit	payments.			
In	each	of	these	instances,	physicians	are	allowed	to	combine	both	public	and	private	income	streams	for	publicly-
insured	services	and,	thus	effectively,	are	allowed	to	work	in	both	the	public	and	private	system.		These	sets	of	
circumstances	again	emphasize	central	points	made	earlier.		Firstly,	the	CHA	regulations	focus	on	the	status	of	
services	and	not	on	the	status	of	service	providers.		Secondly,	provinces	vary	significantly	in	how	they	regulate	the	
mixing	of	public	and	private	income	streams	for	publicly-insured	services.		Thirdly,	provinces	also	vary	significantly	
in	their	regulation	of	private	insurance	–	regulation	that	is	neither	specified	in	or	required	by	the	CHA.							
Discussion
Taking	existing	practices	in	the	Canadian	provinces	as	the	starting	point,	the	maximum	allowance	for	private	
funding,	provision	of	services,	and	private	insurance	given	existing	provincial	practices	is	as	follows:	
no	restrictions	on	the	private	purchase	of	health	services	where	fully	privately	funded;	•	
no	restrictions	on	the	provision	of	private	insurance	for	health	services	(restrictions	only	on	public	•	
reimbursement	for	health	services);		
allowing	non-participating	physicians	to	bill	privately	at	unrestricted	rates	with	patients	being	reimbursed	•	
(up	to	the	public	rate	schedule)	while	allowing	patients	to	insure	for	the	difference;
allowing	participating	physicians	to	bill	the	public	plan	directly	for	some	services	(at	rates	limited	to	the	•	
provincial	fee	schedule)	and	bill	some	patients	directly	for	services	at	unrestricted	rates	(without	public	
compensation)	with	the	patient	being	able	to	insure	for	the	latter.
	All	of	these	practices	are	currently	allowed	by	legislation	in	various	provincial	jurisdictions.		To	the	extent	that	
existing	provincial	legislation	is	presumed	to	be	CHA	compliant,	the	combination	of	the	four	practices	above	could	
also	be	presumed	to	be	CHA	compliant.		As	noted	above,	there	is	nothing	that	binds	the	federal	government	to	
accept	these	practices	as	CHA-compliant;	however,	it	would	be	much	more	difficult	politically	to	levy	penalties	
against	these	practices	which	are	currently	allowed	under	provincial	legislation	in	other	provinces.
Other	practices	(for	an	inventory	of	alternatives,	see	Table	3)	may	be	considered	CHA	compliant	based	on	federal	
interpretations	to	date	of	CHA	requirements	–	most	notably,	the	interpretation	of	user	fees	as	outlined	in	the	
Marleau	letter.		The	Marleau	letter	clearly	outlines	that	facility	fees	are	not	CHA	compliant	in	cases	where	the	
physician	fee	is	covered	under	the	provincial	plan.		The	converse	of	this	interpretation	is	that,	if	the	physician	fee	is	
not	paid	under	the	provincial	plan,	any	associated	facility	fee	is	not,	by	definition,	a	user	fee	contrary	to	the	CHA.		
In	the	case	of	participating	physicians	billing	patients	directly	according	to	the	method	outlined	above,	the	charging	
of	facility	fees	by	either	private	or	public	facilities	for	those	services	would	not	constitute	a	user	fee	in	contravention	
of	the	CHA.		
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Table 3: Private Funding sources and CHA Compliance
Mechanism Provinces Allowed/
in use
CHA Compliance notes
Co-Payment* None Not	CHA	compliant
extra-Billing** None Not	CHA	compliant
Public insurance Premium Ontario,	British	
Columbia
CHA	compliant -failure	to	pay	premium	
must	not	restrict	access	to	
publicly-insured	services
Private insurance Saskatchewan,	New	
Brunswick,	Nova	Scotia,	
Newfoundland
CHA	compliant -CHA	does	not	require	
regulation	of	private	
insurance
Allowing Physicians to Bill Both 
Publicly and Privately
New	Brunswick,	
Prince	Edward	Island,	
Newfoundland
CHA	compliant -PEI	and	Newfoundland	
allow	public	
reimbursement	for	
unrestricted	fees	charged	
by	opted-out	physicians
Facility Fee (user Fee) *** CHA	compliant	under	
specific	circumstances
-facility	fees	are	CHA	
compliant	(charged	by	
private	or	public	facilities)	
if	physician	fee	is	not	
covered	by	public	plan
enhanced service Fee **** CHA	compliant	under	
specific	circumstances
-enhancement	must	not	
be	medically-necessary	
and	must	relate	to	quality	
of	service	(must	not	allow	
quicker	access)
Annual Registration Fee British	Columbia CHA	compliant	under	
specific	circumstances
-failure	to	pay	access	fee	
must	not	restrict	access	to	
publicly-insured	services
MsA Corridor None CHA	compliant	under	
specific	circumstances
-failure	to	pay	charges	
must	not	restrict	access	to	
publicly-insured	services
*Co-payment	here	refers	to	a	fee	charged	to	the	patient	by	the	public	insurance	plan	for	services	that	are	billed	
directly	to	the	plan.
**Extra-billing	here	refers	to	a	fee	charged	to	the	patient	by	the	physician	for	services	that	are	billed	directly	to	the	
plan.
***Physician	fees	at	rates	above	public	schedule	are	billable	(but	not	publicly	covered)	in	New	Brunswick	and	
PEI	(opted-in	physicians)	and	British	Columbia,	Alberta,	Saskatchewan,	Québec,	New	Brunswick,	PEI	and	
Newfoundland	(opted-out	physicians).		In	these	case,	facility	fees	may	be	being	charged	but	there	is	no	requirement	
that	they	be	publicly	reported.		I	am	not	aware	of	instances	of	public	facilities	charging	facility	fees	for	services	
where	the	physician	fee	is	not	covered	by	the	public	plan.
****Unknown.		However,	this	is	a	common	practice	and	fees	for	enhanced	service	quality	are	probably	in	effect	in	
all	provinces.
While	this	would	certainly	also	be	the	case	in	regard	to	non-participating	physicians	if	there	were	no	public	
compensation	for	such	services,	it	may	also	be	the	case	with	regard	to	non-participating	physicians	billing	patients	
directly	at	unrestricted	rates	where	patients	are	reimbursed	for	costs	up	to	the	provincial	fee	schedule	(as	is	
currently	allowed	in	Newfoundland.)		
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Given	this	interpretation,	a	province	which	allowed	the	charging	of	facility	fees	where	the	physician	fee	is	
not	covered	by	public	insurance,	would	not	have	to	report	these	fees	as	user	fees	under	the	CHA	reporting	
requirements.		Should	the	federal	government	choose	to	interpret	such	fees	as	prohibited	user	fees,	it	would	be	free	
to	do	so	under	ministerial	discretion	(either	under	provisions	relating	to	the	reporting	of	user	fees	or	the	general	
accessibility	criterion)	although	the	federal	government	has	never	yet	exercised	these	provisions.		Certainly,	the	
politics	of	doing	so	would	be	much	more	complex	than	is	the	case	for	practices	where	the	province	is	bound	to	
report	the	charging	of	fees	and	the	federal	minister	is	obligated	to	impose	federal	transfer	reductions.
An	additional	issue	that	has	percolated	onto	the	political	agenda	is	the	charging	of	annual	registration	fees	by	
private	facilities	which	then	offer	a	mix	of	uninsured	and	insured	services.		Such	fees	contravene	the	CHA	only	
if	non-payment	of	the	annual	registration	fee	blocks	or	reduces	patient	access	to	publicly	insured	services.		In	
British	Columbia,	the	Medical	Services	Commission	audited	one	Vancouver	clinic	charging	annual	registration	fees	
to	determine	whether	its	practices	were	CHA	compliant	and	determined	that	“…the	clinic	was	operating	within	
provincial	and	federal	laws	because	there	was	no	evidence	of	extra	billing	or	enhanced	services	related	to	the	fees.”58	
The	issue	is	not	whether	all	patients	in	the	clinic	receiving	insured	services	have	paid	the	annual	registration	fee.		A	
private	clinic’s	patient	list	may	become	filled	(a	matter	determined	by	the	physician)	with	patients	who	are	paying	
the	registration	fee	without	the	clinic	actually	denying	care	to	prospective	patients	unwilling	to	pay	the	annual	
registration	fee.59	
The	central	issue	in	regard	to	annual	registration	fees	is	whether	non-paying	patients	are	expressly	denied	access	to	
insured	services.		Two	situations	are	most	likely	to	establish	CHA	non-compliance:	first,	where	two	patients	with	
identical	health	needs	attempt	to	receive	insured	services	from	a	private	clinic	with	the	clinic	refusing	to	provide	
services	to	the	patient	who	did	not	pay	the	annual	registration	while	simultaneously	agreeing	to	provide	insured	
services	to	the	patient	who	agreed	to	pay	the	fee	and,	secondly,	where	a	registered	patient	discontinues	payment	
of	the	annual	registration	fee	and	subsequently	is	removed	from	the	patient	list	and,	as	a	result,	denied	access	to	
insured	services.		However,	in	the	absence	of	such	practices,	annual	registration	fees	appear	to	be	otherwise	CHA-
compliant	–	subject	to	the	caveat	that	the	federal	government	could	always	unilaterally	issue	an	interpretation	of	the	
CHA	to	the	contrary	should	it	choose	to	accept	the	political	trade-offs	and	challenges	inherent	in	doing	so.
There	are	basic	but	important	conclusions	that	flow	from	this	analysis:		it	will	be	politically	more	difficult	for	the	
federal	government	to	implement	transfer	reductions	for	access	fees	when,	as	in	BC,	they	are	not	reported	as	extra-
billing	by	the	province	and	when	they	are	allowed	in	other	provinces	(where	they	were	investigated	and	found	to	
be	CHA	compliant)	than	if	neither	of	these	conditions	were	to	obtain.			Similarly,	it	is	politically	more	difficult	for	
opponents	of	such	fees	to	oppose	them	if	they	are	CHA	compliant	than	if	they	are	not.
PROPOSED PROvINCIAL REFORmS AND THE CHA
The	following	section	examines	proposed	reforms	in	both	Alberta	and	Québec	in	terms	of	their	compliance	with	the	
CHA.		Alberta	has	had	two	major	reports	over	the	past	seven	years	outlining	major	new	directions	for	health	care	
reform	–	the	major	elements	of	which	are	summarized	in	Table	3.		While	neither	report	uses	rhetoric	challenging	
the	CHA,	both	reports	recommended	against	significant	changes	that	could	be	made	under	the	CHA	while,	at	the	
same	time,	including	reforms	that	would	violate	the	CHA.		In	both	cases,	the	CHA	did	not	constitute	the	main	
constraint	on	reform	as	the	government	chose	not	to	proceed	with	even	with	the	elements	of	reform	that	were	
CHA-compliant.
58	Michelle	Lang,	“$3,000-a-year	Will	Get	You	Privileged	Care,”	Calgary Herald,	16	April	2008,	A1.
59	Michelle	Lang,	“Private	Clinic	Willing	to	Treat	Patients	for	Free,”	Calgary Herald,	18	April	2008,	B5.
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Premier’s Advisory Council on Health – The Mazankowski Report
In	December	2001,	the	Premier’s	Advisory	Council	on	Health	made	recommendations	in	a	wide	range	of	areas	
including	health	financing.		Despite	recommending	further	study	of	an	option	that	would	clearly	contravene	the	
CHA	while	dismissing	another	option	that	would	clearly	not	contravene	the	CHA	(on	the	basis	that	it	would),	the	
Report	concludes	that	“We	believe	our	recommendations	are	consistent	with	the	spirit	and	intent	of	the	Canada	
Health	Act.”	(72)		
Several	of	the	Report’s	recommendations	proposed	significant	changes	within	the	parameters	of	the	CHA.		First,	
the	Report	argued	that	“Physicians	should	be	able	to	work	in	public,	private	or	not-for-profit	systems	and	retain	
their	privileges	at	public	hospitals.”	(51)		As	outlined	above,	the	CHA	only	makes	reference	to	the	status	of	health	
services	and	not	the	status	of	health	care	providers.		The	Report	also	recommended,	pursuant	to	“further	study,”		
variable	health	care	premiums	which	would	vary	based	both	on	income	as	well	as	health	service	usage.	(61)		
Premiums,	regardless	of	whether	they	vary	according	to	health	service	usage,	do	not	contravene	the	CHA	unless	
non-payment	of	premiums	results	in	the	denial	of	access	to	public	health	services.	(See	Table	3.)		The	Report	also	
considered	private	insurance.60		The	Report	did	not	recommend	“expanding	private	insurance	for	publicly	funded	
services…”		but,	rather,	concluded	that	“...this	approach	would clearly contravene	the	Canada	Health	Act.”	(56,	
italics	added)		However,	there	is	nothing	in	the	Report’s	description	of	private	insurance	which	is	contrary	to	the	
CHA	(which	has	no	provisions	relating	to	private	insurance)	and	private	insurance,	as	described	in	the	Report,	is	
allowed	under	provincial	legislation	in	five	other	Canadian	provinces.		
Instead,	the	Report	recommends	the	further	study	of	medical	savings	accounts	--	as	one	of		two	reforms	(along	
with	variable	premiums)	having	“the	most	positive	features.”	(61)		The	Report,	however,	notes	that	“...if	people	
are	required	to	pay	for	some	services	once	their	medical	savings	account	is	exhausted,	this	may	contravene	the	
Canada	Health	Act.”	(58)		However,	if	individuals	have	to	pay	for	medically	necessary	services	(above	a	certain	total	
spending	limit)	in	order	to	receive	those	services,	this	would	clearly	contravene	the	CHA.	(See	Table	3.)		
Rather	than	moving	ahead	on	those	aspects	of	the	report	which	could	be	implemented	without	contravening	the	
CHA	including	allowing	physicians	to	mix	public	and	private	income	streams	for	publicly	insured	services	and	
removing	the	province’s	ban	on	private	insurance,	the	recommendations	of	the	report	would	languish	in	face	of	
opposition,	in	part,	to	possible	violations	of	the	CHA	–	thus	setting	the	stage	for	another	set	of	reform	proposals.
Alberta’s Health Policy Framework
Released	in	February	2006,	Alberta’s	Health Policy Framework	proposed	ten	new	directions	for	reform	of	the	existing	
health	care	system.		While	being	couched	in	very	careful	language,	the	Alberta	proposals	contained	elements	
(typically	designated	“for	discussion”)	that,	if	adopted,	would	violate	the	CHA:	requiring	co-payments	(e.g.	user	
fees)	for	non-emergency	acute	care	or	allowing	public	facilities	to	charge	for	expedited	access	to	services	where	the	
physician	fee	is	billed	directly	under	the	provincial	plan.		At	the	same	time,	many	elements	of	the	Alberta	proposals	
which	appear	to	be	relatively	radical	shifts	in	policy	–	such	as	allowing	third-party	private	insurance	for	services	
provided	by	both	opted-out	and	opted-in	physicians,	allowing	both	opted-out	and	opted-in	physicians	to	combine	
both	public	and	private	incomes	sources,	and	encouraging	public	facilities	to	charge	facility	fees	for	privately-funded	
services	–	are	within	the	bounds	of	the	CHA	and	currently,	in	a	number	of	cases,	are	allowed	in	other	Canadian	
provinces.		
6	Alberta,	Getting On with Better Health Care: Health Policy Framework,	August	2006.		Accessed	online	on	16/05/2008	
at	http://www.health.alberta.ca/key/health-care-renewal.html.
Of	those	recommendations	most	germane	to	the	issue	of	private	funding	and	private	health	insurance,	several	
60	In	the	Report,	a	system	allowing	private	insurance	is	defined	as	follows:	“People	would	be	able	to	choose	to	get	both	insured	and	non-
insured	health	service	at	a	private	facility.		They	could	pay	for	these	services	directly	or	through	some	form	of	private	or	supplementary	
insurance.		The	public	system	would	continue	to	provide	the	full	range	of	insured	health	services.”	(56)
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proposals	would	entail	a	significant	shift	in	current	practice	but	would	not	pose	a	challenge	to	the	CHA.		The	report	
(Direction	5)	suggests	reshaping	the	role	of	hospitals	and,	although	vague,	makes	reference	to	the	possibility	of	
“delivering	more	services	through	private	surgical	facilities.”	(13)		While	essential	health	services	would	still	be	
publicly	funded,	Direction	6,	emphasizes	limiting		publicly-funded	health	services	by	excluding	health	services	
which	are	“discretionary,	are	not	of	proven	benefit,	or	are	experimental	in	nature…”	(14)	and	leaving	those	services	
to	be	financed	either	by	patients	directly	or	through	third-party	insurance.		The	latter	would	increase	the	scope	of	
private	funding	and	the	potential	for	private	insurance	but	is	not	a	violation	of	the	CHA.		
The	report	(Direction	7)	commits	the	government	to	examining	alternatives	to	the	single-payer	public	insurance	
system	–	including	co-payments	and	private	insurance	options	--	while	noting	the	need	to	“…consider	how	to	
implement	safeguards	to	protect	the	public	system	and	how	to	provide	benefits	to	those	unable	to	afford	private	
insurance.”	(14)		Co-payments,	fees	charged	to	the	patient	by	the	public	insurance	plan	for	services	that	are	billed	
directly	to	the	plan,	for	non-emergency	but	medically-necessary	services	would	clearly	contravene	the	CHA.	(See	
Table	3.)		That	said,	the	report	is	carefully	couched	and	only	commits	the	Alberta	government	to	“examining	how	
various	alternative	funding	mechanisms…would	work	in	this	province.”	(14)	
In	regard	to	private	insurance,	the	provincial	government	had	announced	in	2005	that	it	would	begin	a	process	of	
studying	the	possibility	of	‘opening	up’	the	health	care	system	to	private	insurance.		Rather	than	simply	removing	
legislative	bans	on	the	provision	of	private	insurance,	the	Alberta	government	publicly	called	for	requests	for	
proposals	to	undertake	an	actuarial	review	of	providing	private	health	insurance	for	publicly-provided	health	
services.		Implicit	in	the	proposal	was	a	highly	directive	approach	to	opening	up	the	health	care	system	to	market	
forces	including	approving	a	single	private	insurer	to	provide	such	insurance.		While	this	initiative	stalled,	the	2006	
report	revisits	the	role	of	private	insurance.		While	much	of	the	2006	proposal	focuses	on	service	areas	which	are	
currently	outside	universal	public	health	insurance	coverage	(e.g.	prescription	drugs,	dental	services,	etc.),	the	
proposal	also	makes	reference	to	the	possibility	of	introducing	third-party	private	insurance	for	non-emergency	
acute	care.		In	terms	of	allowing	third-party	insurance	for	non-emergency	acute	care,	the	CHA	has	no	restrictions	
against	Alberta	lifting	its	current	ban	and,	as	outlined	above,	four	provinces	have	no	such	ban.		
The	proposals	(Direction	9)	also	recommend	allowing	health	care	providers	to	both	bill	publicly	for	some	
procedures	and	bill	privately	for	others	in	contrast	to	the	current	legislation	which	requires	that	a	provider	must	
completely	opt	out	of	the	public	system	completely	in	order	to	undertake	any	private	billing	for	insured	services.		
Certainly,	allowing	physicians	to	bill	some	of	the	services	they	perform	publicly	and	others	privately	would	remove	
legislative	barriers	to	the	growth	of	privately	funded	services.		As	outlined	above,	the	mixing	of	public	and	private	
income	sources	is	allowed	for	opted-out	physicians	in	PEI	(where	individual	services	are	either	paid	publicly	in	
full	or	privately	in	full)	and	Newfoundland		(where	payment	for	individual	services	can	combine	partial	public	
remuneration	with	partial	private	remuneration)	while	mixing	of	public	and	private	incomes	sources	(though	not	for	
individual	services)	is	allowed	for	opted-in	physicians	in	both	PEI	and	New	Brunswick.		
This	section	of	the	report	also	discusses	“…allowing	both	public	and	private	providers	to	offer	enhanced	services	
and	expedited	access	to	a	limited	range	of	‘non-emergency’	services	at	an	appropriate	charge.”	(16)		Whether	
charged	by	a	publicly-funded	hospital	or	a	privately-owned	clinic,	such	charges	would	be	a	violation	of	the	CHA	if	
the	associated	physician	services	were	paid	for	under	the	public	insurance	plan.		However,	this	would	not	be	the	
case	for	charges	by	private	or	public	facilities	where	the	associated	physician	fees	are	not	paid	publicly.		It	may	also	
not	be	the	case	if	the	services	were	to	be	provided	by	a	non-participating	physician	where	the	patient	would	then	be	
eligible	to	be	reimbursed	with	public	funds	(up	to	the	provincial	rate	schedule)	as	is	currently	allowed	in	PEI	and	
Newfoundland.
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Following	a	public	consultation	process	subsequent	to	the	release	of	the	Health Policy Framework,	Alberta	released	
a	revised	version	of	the	recommendations	in	August	2006.61		The	revised	report	does	not	include	the	proposals	
under	the	headings	of	Direction	7	and	Direction	9	in	the	February	report	(please	see	above).		The	remaining	
recommendations	are	not	directly	related	to	the	issue	of	public	and	private	funding	of	health	services	and,	as	
financial	reimbursement	for	health	services	is	the	main	focus	of	the	CHA,	do	not	implicate	issues	which	fall	under	
the	purview	of	the	CHA.
Québec Health Reforms -- The Castonguay Report Proposals
More	recently,	the	Castonguay	Report,	made	public	in	February	2008,	proposes	an	additional	range	of	reform	
alternatives.		The	report	clearly	creates	the	perception	that	the	proposed	changes	to	the	Québec	health	system	
would	contravene	the	Canada Health Act	and	reinforces	the	perception	of	a	dichotomy	between	minor	adjustments	
which	respect	the	CHA	and	radical	reform	that	challenge	the	CHA.		Certainly,	this	perception	was	evident	in	media	
coverage	of	the	report:	“Some	of	Mr.	Castonguay’s	key	recommendations	also	would	lead	to	a	confrontation	with	
Ottawa,	since	they	go	squarely	against	the	Canada Health Act.”	(Gagnon,	2008)		This	perception	is	not	surprising	
considering	that	the	Task	Force	states	bluntly:	“The	federal	government	must	ease	the	requirements	contained	in	
the	Canada Health Act.”	(Québec,	2008a:	5)		The	Task	Force	concludes	that	“The	Canada	Health	Act...hampers	
progress	in	defining	the	public	health	systems	of	the	provinces.”		Furthermore,	“...sooner	or	later,	the	Canada	
Health	Act	will	have	to	be	adapted	to	current	realities.”	(Québec,	2008a:	23)		There	are	two	aspects	to	the	report:	
those	that	deal	directly	with	the	CHA	and,	secondly,	the	substantive	proposals	for	health	service	funding	and	
provision	which	have	implications	for	CHA	compliance.
The	Task	Force	was	mandated	to	“...formulat[e]	recommendations	on	the	best	means	to	ensure	adequate	health	
care	funding”	and,	in	so	doing,	to	“study	changes	that	could	be	suggested	so	that	the	necessary	adjustments	are	
made	to	the	Canada Health Act.”	(2008b:	1,	italics	added)		The	chapter	of	the	report	which	details	this	study	is	a	
scant	five	pages	and,	ultimately,	no	specific	recommendations	are	made	in	regard	to	the	CHA	with	the	exception	
of	the	call	outlined	above	to	ease	CHA	requirements.			The	Report	tersely	notes:	“Since	1984,	the	provincial	health	
care	systems	have	been	closely	governed	by	the	random	interpretation	of	the	five	criteria	of	the	federal	Act.”62	
(2008b:	255)		However,	the	Report	does	not	acknowledge	that	no	province	has	ever	been	penalized	under	the	five	
criteria	outlined	in	the	CHA.63		The	Task	Force	report	is	highly	critical	of	the	imprecision	of	the	CHA:	“...there	is	
no	longer	anyone	who	can	say	for	sure,	without	consulting	a	lawyer,	exactly	what	services	are	really	insured,	within	
what	time	period,	by	who	and	in	what	circumstances	they	must	be	produced.”	(2008b:	257)		This	clearly	misses	
the	point	of	the	Report’s	own	legal	analysis.64		The	CHA	is	not	legally	enforceable,	it	is	not	a	contract	between	two	
parties,	and	it	does	not	confer	rights	on	citizens	which	can	be	invoked	to	force	provinces	to	provide	health	services	
in	any	particular	way.		The	critical	point	is	that	CHA	enforcement	is	primarily	a	political	–	not	legal	–	issue.
61	Alberta,	Getting On with Better Health Care: Health Policy Framework,	August	2006.		Accessed	online	on	16/05/2008	at	http://
www.health.alberta.ca/key/health-care-renewal.html.
62	The	Task	Force	concludes	that	it	has	been	“via	the	five	criteria”	that	the	federal	government	“...seized	this	opportunity	to	introduce	
tight	control...over	the	provincial	hospitalization	and	medical	care	plans	and	their	operation.”	(2008b:	253)
63	Nevertheless,	this	criticism	of	the	CHA	is	not	surprising	given	that,	as	the	Task	Force	notes,	the	CHA	“...is	contested	by	the	Québec	
government[.]”	(Québec,	2008a:	23)			
64	The	Task	Force	commissioned	a	legal	study	in	regard	to	the	CHA	which	concluded	that	“From	the	legal	standpoint,	the	Canada Health 
Act	does	not	confer	any	rights	on	persons	that	they	could	invoke	to	have	their	province	adopt	measures	intended	to	give	them	access	to	
health	services	that	would	be	in	compliance	with	the	Canadian	legislation.”	(2008b:	255)		The	central	implication	of	this	interpretation	is	
that	the	CHA	is	non-binding.
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In	fact,	there	is	very	little	scope	for	potential	conflict	between	the	Castonguay	recommendations	and	CHA	
legislative	requirements.		The	report	recommends	allowing	physicians	to	engage	in	‘mixed	medical	practice’	
(allowing	physicians	to	practice	simultaneously	both	with	the	public	and	private	systems.)		As	outlined	above,	
this	practice	is	currently	allowed	in	other	Canadian	provinces.		The	report	also	recommends	that	the	government	
review	the	scope	of	services	covered	under	the	public	system.		The	Report	is	careful	to	frame	its	proposals	for	
qualitative	limits	on	the	provision	of	health	care	by	defining	“medically	necessary”	in	a	way	that	would	ensure	
that	the	criteria	of	comprehensiveness	would	continue	to	be	met	as	all	medically	necessary	health	services	would	
continue	to	be	insured.		The	Task	Force	recommends	a	tax-based	deductible	charge	for	use	of	health	services.			As	
the	Report	argues,	the	tax	deductible	approach	differs	from	user	fees	in	one	critical	way:	“the	user	fee	is	a	direct	
obstacle	to	access	to	care,	because	it	is	collected	at	the	same	time	as	the	care	is	claimed...”	while	the	tax	deductible	
is	not	collected	at	the	time	the	service	is	used	nor,	presumably,	would	failure	to	pay	the	tax	deductible	result	in	
ineligibility	to	receive	public	health	services	in	the	future.	(226)		As	such,	it	would	not	infringe	the	CHA	ban	on	
user	fees.		Finally,	the	Report	recommends	that	“health	clinics...would	be	entitled	to	collect	an	annual	contribution	
from	registered	patients.”	(2008b,	237)		As	discussed	above,	such	fees	do	not	constitute	a	financial	barrier	to	access	
if	payment	of	the	fee	is	not	required	to	access	insured	services.65		
The	Report	notes	a	number	of	hypothetical	examples	of	ways	in	which	the	CHA	could	potentially	block	health	
system	innovation.	(2008b:	255-6)		The	Task	Force	notes	that	the	Québec	government	is	hesitant	to	limit	access	
to	care:	“In	the	past,	the	Gouvernement	du	Québec	actually	used	these	powers,	particularly	to	limit	the	age	at	
which	vision	examinations	and	dental	care	are	covered.		But	it	hesitates	to	do	so	when	medical	and	hospital	care	
are	involved,	particularly	out	of	fear	that	the	federal	government	will	rely	on	the	Canada Health Act	to	penalize	the	
provinces	financially.”	(2008b:	59)		However,	the	Task	Force	gives	no	examples	of	any	ways	in	which	the	CHA	
constrains	any	recommendations	for	action	the	Task	Force	would	have	otherwise	made.	
In	response	to	its	direct	mandate	to	suggest	changes	to	the	CHA	necessary	to	implement	its	recommendations	on	
the	best	means	to	ensure	adequate	health	care	funding,	the	Report	does	not	make	a	single	recommendation.		The	
central	message	of	this,	in	light	of	the	concrete	recommendations	of	the	Report,	is	that	significant	health	funding	
reform	can	occur	under	the	auspices	of	the	CHA.66		The	important	question	which	remains	is	whether	such	reforms	
are	judged	to	be	politically	feasible.
PUBLIC OPINION ON PRIvATE HEALTH FUNDING AND INSURANCE
While	public	opinion	in	Alberta	is	often	seen	as	generally	supportive	of	market-based	solutions	to	policy	problems,	
public	opinion	polling	strongly	suggests	that	Albertans	are,	in	fact,	less	receptive	to	private	funding	and	insurance	
alternatives	in	the	health	field	than	Canadians	on	average.67		This	pattern	of	public	support	mirrors	cross-provincial	
patterns	in	the	relative	stringency	of	regulation	of	private	health	funding	and	insurance	relative	as	outlined	above.						
65	The	recommended	fee	in	Québec	would	be	$100	annually	and	it	may	be	argued	that	this	does	not	pose	an	unreasonable	barrier	to	access.
66	Somewhat	surprisingly,	the	Task	Force	concludes:	“The	Task	Force	is	convinced	that	the	orientations	proposed	in	its	report	not	only	
respect	the	spirit	of	the	five	criteria	of	the	Canada Health Act,	but	would	have	the	effect	of	improving	access	and	the	quality	of	care.”	
(2008b:	257)		
67	This	conclusion	is	consistent	across	a	wide	number	of	polls	done	recently	(since	2005)	by	a	number	of	Canadian	polling	firms	includ-
ing	Environics,		Compas,	Pollara	and	Ipsos-Reid.		
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Public Support for the CHA and Its Central Principles
Overall	public	opinion	in	Canada	is	relatively	evenly	divided	between	support	for	strong	enforcement	of	the	CHA	
versus	support	for	allowing	greater	provincial	latitude	in	the	provision	of	health	services.			(See	Figure	4.)		Similarly,	
Albertans	are	relatively	evenly	divided	on	the	question.		Certainly,	Alberta	does	not	exhibit	exceptional	support	
for	allowing	greater	provincial	latitude	in	health	care	as	does	Québec.		Even	of	the	English	Canadian	provinces,	
Alberta	is	not	the	most	supportive	of	greater	provincial	latitude	–	an	option	which	receives	more	support	in	British	
Columbia.		
Figure 4: support for strong CHA enforcement, 2006
	Source:	Ipsos-Reid,	Canadian Federation of Nurses Associations,	2006.
Nor	is	Alberta	public	opinion	exceptional	in	regard	to	allowing	extra-billing	and	user	fees.		In	Figure	5,	the	first	
two	columns	for	each	province	report	the	net	support	(percentage	of	respondents	in	favour	minus	the	percentage	
of	respondents	opposing)	for	allowing	payments	for	quicker	access	and	payments	for	service	enhancements.			In	
comparison	with	BC,	Ontario	and	Québec	where	net	opinion	was	in	favour	of	allowing	payment	for	quicker	access,	
net	opinion	in	Alberta	was	opposed	–	more	strongly,	in	fact,		than	the	national	average	as	well	as	other	provinces/
regions	with	the	exception	of	Atlantic	Canada.			While	net	opinion	across	all	regions	is	in	favour	of	allowing	
payments	for	service	enhancements,	this	option	receives	the	least	support	in	Alberta.	
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Figure 5: support for Paying for Quicker Access and/or service enhancements, 2005, 2006
Source:	Support	for	‘Pay	for	Quicker	Access’	and	‘Pay	for	Service	Enhancements’	–	Pollara,	Health Care in Canada, 
2005;	net	agree	and	net	strongly	agree	with	pay	for	enhanced/quicker	services	--	Ipsos-Reid,	Canadian Medical 
Association Survey,	2006.
Notes:	The	second	set	of	questions	(Ipsos-Reid)	asks	respondents	if	they	strongly	agree/agree/disagree/strongly	
disagree	that	the	‘best	health	care	system’	would	be	one	in	which	government	pays	only	for	emergency	or	essential	
care	with	an	option	for	patient	payment	for	enhanced	or	quicker	services.		‘Net	agree’	reports	the	total	percentage	
of	agree/strongly	agree	responses	minus	the	total	percentage	of	disagree/strongly	disagree.		‘Net	strongly	agree’	
reports	the	percent	of	strongly	agree	responses	minus	the	percentage	of	strongly	disagree	responses.
In	Figure	5,	the	third	and	fourth	column	for	each	province	report	agreement	with	the	statement	that	the	best	
health	care	system	would	be	one	in	which	the	government	pays	for	emergency	and	essential	medical	care	while	
patients	would	have	the	option	to	pay	for	enhanced	or	quicker	services.		Overall	support	is	similar	among	Albertan	
and	Canadian	respondents	more	generally	with	opinion	being	marginally	in	favour.		However,	examining	only	
respondents	with	strong	opinions	in	favour	or	against,	Alberta	is	among	the	provinces/regions	(along	with	British	
Columbia	and	Atlantic	Canada)	where	this	model	receives	the	most	opposition.
Public Support for Private Purchase and Insurance of Services
As	argued	above,	Alberta	goes	beyond	the	requirements	of	the	CHA	in	banning	the	private	provision/purchase	
of	certain	health	services	as	well	as	in	banning	private	insurance	for	all	publicly-insured	services.		There	is	strong	
public	support	in	Alberta	for	these	regulations	and	Alberta	is	not	exceptional	in	this	regard.
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Figure 6: support for Patient Paying/insuring, 2005, 2006
Source:	‘Net	Agree	–	Patient	Pay/Insure,’	‘Net	Strongly	Agree	–	Patient	Pay/Insure’	and	‘Net	Support	–	Parallel	
Private	vs.	Status	Quo’	from	Ipsos-Reid,	Canadian Medical Association Survey,	August	2006;	‘Net	Agree	–	Insure	
Non-Emergency’	and	‘Net	Strongly	Agree	–	Insure	Non-Emergency’	from	Pollara,	Health Care in Canada, 2005.
In	Figure	6,	the	first	two	columns	for	each	province	report	responses	to	the	question	of	whether	respondents	
support	allowing	patients	to	pay	for	and/or	insure	for	services	when	the	public	system	does	not	provide	timely	
access	to	those	services.			Of	all	provinces,	opposition	among	all	respondents	is	highest	in	Alberta.		When	
examining	only	those	with	strong	opinions,	opposition	in	Alberta	remains	significantly	above	levels	in	Canada	in	
general	although	lower	than	in	Atlantic	Canada	and	British	Columbia.		
	
The	next	two	columns	for	each	province	report	agreement	with	the	statement	that	patients	should	be	allowed	to	
insure	and/or	pay	for	non-emergency	services	outside	of	the	public	system.		The	balance	of	public	opinion	among	
all	respondents	across	all	provinces/regions	is	favourable	with	opinion	in	Alberta	(26%	net	in	favour)	being	only	
slightly	more	favourable	than	the	national	average	(22%	net	in	favour.)		However,	examining	only	respondents	with	
strong	opinions	in	favour	and	against,	opinion	in	Alberta	is	the	most	resistant	except	for	the	Atlantic	provinces.	
	
A	similar	pattern	emerges	in	regard	to	support	for	a	parallel	private	system	versus	the	status	quo.68		Comparing	net	
levels	of	support	for	a	parallel	private	system	versus	the	status	quo,	Alberta	respondents	were	slightly	less	opposed	
on	balance	than	Canadian	respondents	more	generally	but	more	resistant	than	respondents	in	BC,	Saskatchewan,	
Manitoba	and	Québec.		
	
Respondents	were	asked	which	of	six	options	they	would	most	strongly	support	if	more	money	was	needed	to	
improve	the	health	care	system.		Albertans,	along	with	respondents	from	all	provinces,	were	most	strongly	supportive	
of	moving	money	from	other	policy	areas	to	health	care	(31%).		Of	the	three	main	alternatives	to	increasing	public	
funding	(either	through	budgetary	shifts	or	increased	taxes	as	reported	in	Figure	7),		Albertan	respondents	were	
relatively	equally	split	among	allowing	private	insurance	(13%),	requiring	patients	to	pay	a	portion	of	the	costs	[user	
68		Respondents	were	asked	about	their	support	for	four	options.		The	medicare	plus	private	parallel	system		scenario	would	include	a	
public	system	providing	universal	coverage	of	services	but	allowing	individuals	the	option	of	purchasing	private	insurance	for	all	services	
(with	tax	incentives	to	promote	access)	and	allowing	physicians	deliver	services	in	both	systems.	Ipsos-Reid,	2006:	6.
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fees]	(11%)	and	allowing	off-hours	access	for	private	paying	patients	(12%).		In	all	three	cases,	levels	of	provincial	
support	closely	matched	the	national	average	although	support	for	off-hours	access	for	private	paying	patients	was	
somewhat	higher	in	Alberta	than	in	Canada	as	a	whole	(9%).		However,	for	none	of	these	options	was	Alberta	public	
opinion	the	most	supportive	of	all	provinces.			
Figure 7: support for options for Health Funding Reform, 2007
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Source:	Pollara,	Health Care in Canada,	2007.		[Question	19.]
Notes:		Respondents	were	asked	to	identify	one	of	six	options	in	response	to	the	following	question:	“If	more	money	
was	needed	to	improve	the	health	care	system,	which	of	the	following	options	would	you	most	strongly	support?”		
The	six	options	were	as	follows:	moving	money	from	other	non-health	care,	having	private	insurance	cover	portion	of	
cost,	increasing	taxes	and	directing	it	to	the	health	care	system,	requiring	patients	to	pay	portion	of	costs,	off	hours	
access	for	private	paying	patients,	and	off	hours	access	for	patients	from	other	countries.
Overall,	the	public	opinion	data	discussed	above	suggest	that	public	opinion	in	Alberta	is	not	exceptional	in	its	
resistance	to	allowing	patients	to	pay	or	insure	for	services	but	it	does	appear	to	lie	on	the	more	resistant	end	of	the	
cross-provincial	spectrum.		Not	surprisingly,	these	patterns	of	public	support	are	mirrored	in	the	relative	stringency	
of	the	regulation	of	private	payment	and	insurance	of	health	services	in	Alberta.
Explaining Public Opinion in Alberta
This	raises	the	obvious	question	as	to	why	Alberta	public	opinion	is	less	favourable	to	private	funding/private	
insurance	than	public	opinion	in	other	provinces.				The	next	section	considers	three	possible	explanations:	levels	
of	public	spending	on	health	services,		public	perceptions	regarding	the	quality	of	public	health	services	in	Alberta,	
and,	finally,	public	perceptions	regarding	the	impacts	of	private	funding	on	the	quality	of	health	services.
Levels of Public Spending on Health Services
Perhaps	the	most	obvious	explanation	for	resistance	to	reform	would	be	that	the	system	is	relatively	well-funded.				
Health	care	expenditures	in	Alberta	(in	real	dollars	per	capita)	were	at	the	national	average	in	the	early	1990s.	(See	
Figure	8.)		However,	following	cutbacks	in	Alberta,	provincial	expenditures	fell	significantly	below	the	national	
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average.		In	the	period	from	1996	to	2005,	health	care	expenditures	grew	at	a	faster	rate	in	Alberta	than	nationally	
with	Alberta	surpassing	the	national	average	per	capita	expenditure	after	2000.			
Figure 8: Public Health Care expenditures in Alberta and Canada, Constant $ per capita, 1990-2005
PROVINCIAL HEALTH CARE  EXPENDITURES
Alberta and Canada, 1990-2006
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Source:	Canada	Institutes	for	Health	Information,	Statistics	Canada.	Table	B.4.7.	
Thus,	by	2006,	while	provincial	government	health	expenditures	per	capita	in	Alberta	were	comparable	to	
expenditures	in	Saskatchewan,	Manitoba,	and	Newfoundland,	they	were	the	highest	of	all	provinces	and	just	under	
10%	higher	than	the	average	for	all	provinces.			(See	Figure	9.)		Perhaps	more	strikingly,	the	rate	of	growth	in	provincial	
health	care	expenditures	has	been	highest	in	Alberta	by	a	considerable	margin	over	the	six	year	period	from	2000	to	
2006.		(See	Figure	10.)		Expenditure	increases	in	Alberta	from	2004	to	2005	were	nearly	double	the	national	average.		
Expenditure	growth	in	Alberta	from	2005	to	2006	moderated	but	was	still	above	the	national	average.			
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Figure 9: Public Health Care expenditures in Alberta and Canada, 1990-2005
Source:	Canada	Institutes	for	Health	Information,	Statistics	Canada.	Table	B.4.2.
Note:	These	expenditures	are	in	current	dollars	per	capita	and	are	not	comparable	with	expenditure	data	reported	
in	Figure	8.
Figure 10: Change in Provincial Health Care expenditures, All Provinces, real (constant) dollars per capita, 
2000-2006
Source:	Canada	Institutes	for	Health	Information,	Statistics	Canada.	Table	B.4.2.		Constant	dollars	as	calculated	by	
author.
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
C
u
rr
en
t 
$ 
p
er
 c
ap
it
a
BC AB SK MB ON QB NB NS PEI NF CDA
Public Sector Health Expenditures, 2006
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
C
u
rr
en
t 
$ 
p
er
 c
ap
it
a
BC AB SK MB ON QB NB NS PEI NF CDA
ANNUAL CHANGE IN HEALTH EXPENDITURES
Per Capita, 2000-2006
2000-2006
2004-2005
2005-6
30
Public Perceptions of the Quality of Public Health Services
The	comparatively	high	levels	of	expenditure	and	expenditure	growth	in	Alberta	may	have	a	significant	impact	on	
the	limited	public	demand	for	reform.		Most	simply,	the	limited	appetite	for	reform	in	Alberta	may	be	the	result	
of	higher	levels	of	satisfaction	with	the	quality	of	health	services	provided	in	this	province	with	the	latter	being	a	
function	of	comparatively	high	levels	of	public	expenditure	and	expenditure	growth.		While	there	does	appear	to	be	
a	general	relationship	across	provinces	between	overall	levels	of	health	funding	and	perceptions	of	quality	and	levels	
of	personal	satisfaction	with	health	services,	the	evidence	of	Alberta	exceptionalism	in	terms	of	public	satisfaction	
with	the	health	system	is	mixed.
Table 4: Total Health expenditures (per capita), Public Health expenditures as % of Total, and Change in 
Provincial Health expenditures, 2000-2006
Total expenditure
($ per  capita) 2007
% Public (provincial)
2007
Annual Average % Change  in Public (provincial) 
expenditure (real $ per capita)
2007 2007 2000-2006
BC 4713 71.5 2.0
AB 5390 74 6.4
SK/MB 5218 77.8 4.7
ON 4975 67.2 3.9
QB 4371 71.7 2.5
Atlantic 4946 76.6 4.8
Source:	Canada	Institutes	for	Health	Information,	Table	B.1.2	(total	expenditure),	Table	B.4.3	(provincial	
government	expenditure	as	proportion	of	total	expenditure),	and	Table	B.1.4	(provincial	government	health	
expenditure)	with	constant	dollars	calculated	by	author.	
Notes:	Regional	totals	(SK/MB	and	Atlantic)	are	population-weighted	averages	as	calculated	by	author.		The	public	
opinion	data	used	in	the	correlations	were	not	available	on	a	disaggregated	basis	for	these	regions.
	In	their	comparative	examination	across	26	nations	(primarily	North	American	and	European),	Tuohy,	Flood	and	
Stabile	find	that	“…both	the	level	of	public	funding	and	the	public	share	of	total	health	spending	are	significantly	
correlated	with	aggregate	levels	of	satisfaction	with	the	system	as	a	whole.”69		The	correlation	of	various	measures	of	
expenditure	(including	total	health	expenditures,	public	expenditures	as	a	percent	of	total	health	expenditures,	and	
change	in	provincial	health	expenditures	as	reported	in	Table	4)	with	both	perceptions	of	the	quality	of	available	health	
services	as	well	as	perceptions	of	personal	experiences	with	the	health	system	in	Tables	5	and	6.		
69	Carolyn	Hughes	Tuohy,	Colleen	M.	Flood	and	Mark	Stabile,	“How	Does	Private	Finance	Affect	Public	Health	Care	Systems?	Marshaling	
the	Evidence	from	OECD	Nations,”	Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law,	29,	3	(June	2004):	388.
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Table 5: expenditure Measures and Perceptions of Quality of Available Health services
% of
 Respondents
Report Card -- Quality of Available Health services
A B C F A+B C+F
(A+B)-
(C+F)
BC 25 38 32 5 63 37 26
AB 16 46 27 11 62 38 24
SK/MB 29 35 18 18 64 36 28
ON 22 42 26 10 64 36 28
QB 14 45 32 8 59 40 19
Atlantic 35 27 30 7 62 37 25
Total 2007* 0.05 -0.01 -0.46 0.36 0.39 -0.33 0.37
Change 2000-6* 0.01 0.00 -0.25 0.25 0.06 -0.06 0.06
% Public 2007* 0.27 -0.33 -0.16 0.20 0.00 -0.01 0.00
*rho	squared
Source:	Public	opinion	data	from	Ipsos-Reid,	Canadian Medical Association 2007 Report Card Study.		Information	
regarding	online	availability	at	http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=3604.
Notes:	Expenditure	measures	(rows	7-9)	correspond	with	the	three	measures	presented	in	Table	4.
Table 6: expenditure Measures and Perceptions of Personal experience Accessing Health services
% of
 Respondents
Report Card -- Personal experience Accessing Health services
A B C F A+B C+F
(A+B)-
(C+F)
BC 34 34 25 7 68 32 36
AB 28 46 17 7 74 24 50
SK/MB 30 39 19 13 69 32 37
ON 35 36 18 10 71 28 43
QB 29 37 22 11 66 33 33
Atlantic 33 37 20 6 70 26 44
Total 2007* -0.04 0.49 -0.56 -0.01 0.75 -0.43 0.58
Change 2000-6* -0.17 0.72 -0.76 -0.03 0.74 -0.66 0.73
% Public 2007* -0.22 0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
*rho	squared
Source:	See	Table	5.
Notes:	See	Table	5.
As	illustrated	in	Table	5,	there	is	no	correlation	between	the	three	aggregated	measures	of	perceptions	of	quality	
and	either	change	over	time	in	provincial	health	expenditures	or	public	expenditures	as	a	proportion	of	total	
expenditures.		However,	the	relationship	between	these	aggregate	measures	of	perceptions	of	quality	of	available	
health	services	and	total	health	expenditures	are	moderate	and	in	the	expected	direction	(with	higher	levels	of	
spending	being	positively	correlated	with	positive	perceptions	of	health	services	and	inversely	related	with	the	
overall	negative	perceptions	of	health	services.)
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While	Table	6	illustrates	that	there	is	no	relationship	between	perceptions	of	personal	experiences	accessing	health	
services	and	the	proportion	of	total	expenditures	comprised	of	public	expenditures,	there	is	a	strong	correlation	
between	perceptions	of	personal	experiences	and	total	levels	of	health	service	expenditure	as	well	as	change	in	
provincial	public	expenditures	from	2000	to	2006.		These	correlations	are	considerably	more	robust	than	the	
correlations	between	these	expenditure	measures	and	more	general	perceptions	of	the	quality	of	available	health	
services	as	examined	above	in	Table	5.		
Thus,	while	the	comparative	cross-national	results	of	Tuohy,	Stabile	and	Flood	are	not	replicated	in	cross-provincial	
patterns	in	regard	to	a	strong	correlation	between	higher	proportions	of	public	spending	and	perceptions	of	the	
quality	of	health	services,	their	findings	do	find	some	support	in	the	correlation	between	total	spending	levels	
as	well	as	increases	in	provincial	spending	over	time	and	perceptions	of	personal	experiences	in	accessing	health	
services.
Contrary	to	these	generalized	patterns	across	provinces,	when	asked	about	their	perceptions	of	the	overall	quality	of	
the		health	care	services	available	to	them	and	their	families,	Albertan	respondents	are	not	exceptional	despite	the	
expectations	generated	by	high	levels	of	funding	for	health	services	in	Alberta.		As	Figure	11	illustrates,	the	number	
of	respondents	assigning	grades	of	C	(27%)	and	F	(11%)	is	very	close	to	the	national	averages	of	28%	and	9%	
respectively.	(See	also	Table	5.)		Examining	grades	of	C	and	F	together	as	an	overall	indicator,	Albertan	respondents	
are	no	less	likely	to	perceive	the	health	services	available	to	them	to	be	of	low	quality	than	respondents	in	any	other	
province	(except	Québec.)		Thus,	the	general	relationship	between	levels	of	funding	and	perceptions	of	quality	
found	among	all	provinces	does	not	apply	in	any	direct	sense	to	the	specific	example	of	Alberta.			
The	Tuohy,	Flood	and	Stabile	hypothesis	as	applied	to	Alberta	finds	only	slightly	more	support	in	Albertan’s	
perceptions	of	their	own	experience	with	the	health	care	system.		In	terms	of	their	grading	of	their	own	personal	
experience	with	the	health	care	system,	Alberta	respondents	are	only	slightly	less	likely	to	assign	a	grade	of	C	
(17%)	or	F	(7%)	than	the	national	averages	of	20%	and	9%	respectively.70		(See	also	Table	6.)		Similarly,	Albertan	
respondents	are	also	less	likely	than	recipients	elsewhere	to	assess	their	own	personal	experience	a	grade	of	A.		
However,	Albertan	respondents	are	significantly	more	likely	than	respondents	elsewhere	to	assign	a	grade	of	B	
while	recipients	elsewhere	are	more	likely	to	assign	a	grade	of	C.		While	it	is	possible	that	Albertans’	more	positive	
personal	experiences	with	the	health	care	system	may	help	explain	lowered	support	for	alternative	modes	of	health	
care	financing,	given	the	slightness	of	differences	as	well	as	the	mixed	evidence	on	this	score,	significant	caution	
needs	to	be	exercised	in	adopting	such	an	interpretation.71			
70	These	differences	are	not,	however,	statistically	significant.
71	The	other	main	poll	to	track	satisfaction	with	health	services	is	the	Pollara	Health Care in Canada	survey	asks	respondents	about	their	
perceptions	of	the	quality	of	health	care	in Canada.		Albertans	in	2007	were	notably	more	likely	than	Canadian	respondents	more	gener-
ally	to	answer	in	the	affirmative.	However,	this	marks	a	shift	from	2006	when	Albertans	were	equally	likely	to	respond	in	the	affirmative	as	
respondents	across	Canada	more	generally.		The	Pollara	survey	reports	the	margin	of	error	for	the	national	sample	but	not	for	provincial	
samples	so	it	is	difficult	to	determine	whether	the	difference	in	perceptions	of	quality	in	Alberta	between	2006	and	2007	is	statistically	sig-
nificant.		Thus,	the	evidence	from	this	poll	is	mixed,	highly	variable	over	time	and	statistically	slight.		Moreover,	it	is	difficult	to	interpret	at	
the	question	asks	whether	Canadians	are	receiving	quality	health	services	–	shifting	the	focus	from	perceptions	of	the	quality	of	the	health	
services	they	themselves	are	receiving	to	perceptions	regarding	the	quality	of	services	received	by	others	as	well	as	shifting	the	geographic	
focus	from	the	quality	of	health	services	in	Alberta	to	the	quality	of	health	services	in	Canada.
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Figure 11: dissatisfaction with overall Health Care services and Most Recent encounter with Health system, 2007
Source:	Ipsos-Reid,	Health System Report Card,	2007.		
Notes:		Respondents	were	asked	to	assign	a	grade	of	A,	B,	C,	or	F	to	overall	health	services	and	their	own	most	
recent	experience	with	the	health	care	system.
Perceptions of Impact of Private Funding and Insurance on Health Service Quality
While	evidence	of	Alberta	exceptionalism	in	regard	to	satisfaction	with	the	existing	health	care	system	is	mixed,	the	
evidence	is	more	clear	that	Alberta	public	opinion	regarding	the	perceived	impact	of	private	funding	and	private	
insurance	on	the	quality	of	health	services	is	starkly	distinct	from	other	provinces.	
Albertan	respondents	are	the	least	likely	in	any	province	to	feel	that	private	insurance	will	have	a	positive	impact	
on	them	personally	with	only	3%	more	Albertans	anticipating	a	positive	impact	than	those	anticipating	a	negative	
impact.	(See	Figure	12.)		When	asked,	in	the	context	of	a	discussion	of	health	care	financing,	whether	greater	
private	involvement	would	improve	the	quality	of	healthcare	services	offered	in	Canada,	Alberta was the only province 
in which public perceptions were that greater private involvement would lower the quality of health services.		
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Figure 12: Perceived impact of Greater Private involvement
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Sources:	Personal	Impact	of	Private	Insurance,	2005	--		Pollara,	Health Care in Canada Survey,	2005;	Perceived	
Impact	of	Greater	Private	Involvement	--	Ipsos-Reid,	Canadian Federation of Nurses Associations,	January	2006;	
Perceived	Impact	of	Medicare	Plus	Parallel	Private	System	--	Ipsos-Reid,	Canadian Medical Association Survey,	2006.
In	terms	of	perceptions	of	the	impact	of	allowing	a	parallel	private	system	to	exist	alongside	public	health	insurance	
on	health	services,	Albertans	are,	on	balance,	more	likely	to	perceive	a	negative	effect	than	respondents	in	any	other	
province/region	with	the	exception	of	Atlantic	Canada.		Thus,	in	terms	of	their	perceptions	of	the	likely	impact	of	
private	funding	and	insurance	on	the	quality	of	health	services,	Alberta	public	opinion,	if	it	can	be	argued	to	be	
exceptional,	is	so	by	virtue	of	the	prevalence	of	negative	perceptions	regarding	the	impacts	of	such	changes.
The	regulation	of	private	funding	and	insurance	of	health	insurance	in	Alberta	goes	beyond	what	is	required	by	
the	CHA	and	is	more	stringent	than	is	the	case	in	a	number	of	other	Canadian	provinces.		This	pattern	mirrors	
cross-provincial	patterns	in	public	support	for	private	funding	and	insurance	by	which	Albertans	are	less	supportive	
generally	of	private	funding	and	private	insurance	than	is	the	case	for	Canadians	more	generally.
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CONCLUSIONS
A	careful	examination	of	the	CHA	including	consideration	of	the	provisions	of	the	legislation,	enforcement	precedents	
and	the	regulation	of	private	funding	and	insurance	for	health	services	in	other	Canadian	provinces	highlights	that	
there	is	broad	scope	for	reform	of	regulation	of	private	funding	and	insurance	for	health	services	under	the	CHA.		As	
highlighted	in	Table	3,	only	a	limited	number	of	reform	options	that	have	been	discussed	in	Alberta	are	clearly	non-CHA	
compliant	including	user	fees	(where	the	physician	fee	is	paid	by	the	public	plan)	and	extra-billing	(where	a	physician	
receives	both	public	and	private	payment	for	a	given	instance	of	providing	a	service.)		A	second	set	of	options	which	have	
been	discussed	in	the	Alberta	context	may	or	may	not	be	CHA-compliant	depending	on	the	manner	in	which	they	are	
implemented	including	user	fees	(where	the	physician	fee	is	not	covered	by	the	public	plan),	enhanced	service	fees,	and	
annual	registration	fees	charged	by	private	providers	who	provide	a	mix	of	services	including	those	which	are	publicly-
insured.		A	final	set	of	options	which	have	been	discussed	but	not	implemented	in	Alberta	despite	being	CHA-compliant	
include	allowing	private	insurance	for	otherwise	publicly-insured	services	and	allowing	physicians	to	receive	public	
payment	for	some	services	and	private	payment	for	some	services	(though	not	from	both	sources	for	a	particular	instance	
in	which	a	service	is	provided.)		
Alberta	is	more	restrictive	in	its	regulation	in	this	regard	than	many	other	provinces	and	than	is	required	by	the	CHA.		At	
the	same	time,	the	enforcement	of	the	CHA	is	primarily	a	political	–	rather	than	legal	–	issue	and	there	is	relatively	broad	
scope	for	the	federal	government	to	make	discretionary	determinations	that	particular	practices	are	not	CHA-compliant.		
However,	to	date,	the	federal	government	has	chosen	not	to	exercise	this	discretionary	power.		Without	assessing	the	
potential	effects	of	specific	reforms	or	their	desirability,	there	are	clear	conclusions	that	can	be	drawn	in	regard	to	the	
political	implications	which	result.			
The	fit	between	proposals	for	reform	and	the	CHA	is	important	in	the	politics	of	reform.		Public	opinion	in	Alberta	
contains	a	significant	element	supportive	of	strong	CHA	enforcement	with	Albertans	being	no	more	supportive	than	
Canadians	more	generally	of	greater	provincial	latitude	than	allowed	by	the	CHA.		Reform	proposals	in	Alberta	to	date	
have	included	provisions	that	would	clearly	challenge	the	CHA	while,	at	the	same	time,	incorporating	important	elements	
representing	significant	reforms	to	the	system	of	health	service	funding	which	are	consistent	with	the	CHA.		Proposals	
which	might	otherwise	generate	sufficient	public	consensus	may	fail	to	do	so	if	successfully	cast	by	proponents	of	reform	
as	a	challenge	to	the	CHA.			
Public	opinion	in	Alberta	is	less	supportive	than	other	provinces	of	significant	changes	to	the	status	quo	in	the	funding	
of	health	services.		This	may	be	partly	the	result	of	a	widely	held	perception	–	resulting	from	the	history	of	health	care	
reform	in	Alberta	--	that	the	two	broad	options	for	health	funding	reform	are	marginal	adjustments	to	the	status	quo	
which	respect	the	CHA	or	more	far-reaching	changes	which	violate	the	CHA.		An	Edmonton	Journal	column	discussing	
proposed	reforms	in	2005	provides	a	powerful	illustration	of	this	perceived	dichotomy:		“It’s	impossible	to	know	whether	
[Alberta	Health	Minister]	Evans	is	leading	the	charge	for	a	private,	parallel	health-care	system,	finally	free	of	the	constraints	
of	the	Canada	Health	Act,	or	for	more	modest	reforms.	[…]		Are	we	talking	about	a	major	realignment	of	services	--	as	if	
the	Canada	Health	Act	didn’t	exist…		Or	some	tinkering?”72		The	implication	is	clear:	major	reform	requires	proceeding	as	
if	the	CHA	does	not	exist	while	reforms	under	the	‘constraints’	of	the	CHA	cannot	amount	to	more	than	minor	tinkering.		
However,	there	is	a	broad	scope	for	reform	of	the	regulation	of	private	funding	and	private	insurance	for	health	services	
under	the	CHA.		This	presents	another	--	perhaps	more	realistic	--	option	for	reform.							
72	Sheila	Pratt,	“Klein’s	Third	Way	is	a	One-Way	Trip	on	a	Merry-Go-Round,”	Edmonton Journal,	25	September	2005,	A16.
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